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Regulating Identity: Medical Regulation as Social 
Control 
Matt Lamkin* 
New biomedical technologies offer growing opportunities not only to 
prevent and treat illnesses, but also to change how healthy people think, 
feel, behave, and appear to others. Controversies over these 
nontherapeutic practices are a pervasive feature of contemporary 
American culture, from students on “study drugs” and cops on steroids 
to skin-lightening by black celebrities and the over-prescription of 
antidepressants. Yet the diversity of these controversies often masks their 
common root—namely, disputes about the propriety of using medical 
technologies as tools for shaping one’s identity. 
Some observers believe these so-called “enhancement” practices 
threaten important values, offering unfair advantages to users and 
undermining their ability to lead “authentic” lives. But existing systems 
of medical regulation, which were designed to promote the safety of 
therapeutic treatments and to deter drug abuse, are largely blind to 
concerns beyond protecting human health. As identity-modifying 
practices continue to proliferate, calls are growing to restrict access to 
these technologies on moral grounds. 
These proposals overlook the United States’ extensive and 
unfortunate experiences regulating nontherapeutic medical practices to 
enforce contested conceptions of morality. From Prohibition and the war 
on drugs to laws restricting contraceptives and abortion procedures, 
these efforts have been costly, ineffective, and intrusive. They have also 
interfered with fundamental liberties involving bodily integrity and 
identity—a fact that is widely recognized in the context of reproduction 
technologies, but largely overlooked with respect to other medical 
interventions. Rather than expanding our reliance on contested moral 
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concerns in policing access to medical interventions, the U.S. should 
purge its existing regulation of morality-based intrusions and recommit 
itself to protecting human health. 
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INTRODUCTION 
New biomedical technologies offer growing opportunities not 
only to prevent and treat illnesses, but also to modify identities. 
Cosmetic procedures can change one’s physical appearance, 
including altering one’s sex and perceptions of one’s race or age. 
Healthy students and professionals seek to enhance their intelligence 
using drugs designed to treat attention deficit disorders, while others 
use antidepressants not to treat depression, but to alter their 
personalities—to become more confident and outgoing, less anxious 
and brooding. 
Some observers believe these identity-modifying practices 
threaten important values. Disparities in access to drugs that improve 
cognition could exacerbate economic inequalities. Using cosmetic 
procedures to lighten one’s skin or to produce more “Western-
looking” eyes can reinforce beauty standards that are infused with 
bigotry. Responding to feelings of sadness or anger by taking 
antidepressants may reduce individuals’ motivation to address the life 
challenges and social injustices that sometimes underlie 
these emotions. 
These concerns are qualitatively different from the key aim that 
ostensibly animates the United States’ existing systems of medical 
regulation: protecting human health. The Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act seeks to protect health by ensuring that the therapeutic 
benefits of drugs and medical devices outweigh these products’ risks. 
The Controlled Substances Act likewise purports to restrict access to 
drugs based on assessments of their health risks and therapeutic 
benefits. State-level regulation of medical practice, including 
physician licensing and malpractice statutes, aims to deter doctors 
from acting in ways that threaten patient health. 
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Because these existing regulatory systems are not designed to 
respond to the moral concerns raised by identity-modifying 
interventions—often referred to as “enhancements”1—some 
observers have called for expanding the scope of medical regulation 
to address such concerns. While these proposals vary in their 
particulars, they share a common core: empowering regulators not 
merely to protect health, but to “adjudicate among competing 
ethical claims”2 and restrict access to biomedical interventions based 
on “judgments about the technology’s social and ethical 
implications.”3 As Francis Fukuyama has argued: “What should we 
do in response to biotechnology that in the future will mix great 
potential benefits with threats that are either physical and overt or 
spiritual and subtle? The answer is obvious: We should use the power 
of the state to regulate it.”4 
This article argues it is far from obvious that we should use state 
power to address the “spiritual and subtle” threats posed by 
biotechnology. Indeed, the United States’ considerable experience in 
restricting biomedical interventions on moral grounds provides 
ample reason to be skeptical of such proposals. From alcohol and 
drug prohibition to laws restricting contraceptives and abortion 
procedures, when regulation has strayed from protecting health to 
enforcing morals these efforts have been costly, ineffective, and 
intrusive. The United States would be better served by reducing, 
rather than expanding, its reliance on contested moral considerations 
in limiting access to biomedical interventions. 
Part I describes how aspects of human identities are increasingly 
susceptible to modification by biomedical interventions, and outlines 
the concerns these practices raise among bioethicists and other 
observers. Part II describes how the United States’ existing systems 
of medical regulation, which ostensibly focus on protecting human 
 
 1.  CARL ELLIOTT, BETTER THAN WELL: AMERICAN MEDICINE MEETS THE 
AMERICAN DREAM xvii–xviii (2003) (defining “enhancement technologies” as “drugs and 
procedures that are employed by doctors not just to control illness, but also to improve human 
capacities or characteristics.”). 
 2.  FRANCIS FUKUYAMA & FRANCO FURGER, BEYOND BIOETHICS: A PROPOSAL FOR 
MODERNIZING THE REGULATION OF HUMAN BIOTECHNOLOGIES 17 (2007). 
 3.  FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 214 (2002). 
 4.  Id. at 10. 
03.LAMKIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  3:21 PM 
501 Regulating Identity  
 505 
health, are generally blind to the broader moral concerns expressed 
by critics of enhancements. This part also describes several proposals 
to empower regulators to restrict identity-modifying practices on the 
basis of concerns other than protecting individuals from 
physical harm. 
Part III offers three arguments against regulating medical 
interventions to enforce contested moral views. First, the abject 
failure of the United States’ efforts to prohibit the use of alcohol and 
other mind-altering drugs cautions against expanding this strategy to 
restrict identity-modifying practices. Despite the Controlled 
Substances Act’s purported emphasis on preserving health, in its 
implementation the federal government has used the Act as an 
instrument of social control—to enforce prevailing morality and 
combat social deviance. Like Prohibition before it, the “war on 
drugs” has been both costly and ineffective, offering a poor model 
for reforming the regulation of biomedical interventions. 
Second, these reform proposals rest on a distinction between 
“therapies” and “enhancements” that is too malleable to accomplish 
reform advocates’ goals. Proponents of expanding the scope of 
medical regulation call for distinguishing between interventions that 
treat illnesses, which would continue to be regulated on the basis of 
safety, and enhancements, which would be subjected to broader 
scrutiny and tighter restrictions. But it is remarkably easy to 
characterize any biomedical intervention that alleviates some form of 
human suffering as a treatment for a legitimate illness. Policies that 
singled out identity-modifying interventions for special restrictions 
would merely increase incentives to characterize these practices as 
treatments for illnesses. 
Finally, some medical interventions can implicate bodily integrity 
and identity in profound ways. Restricting these practices is 
tantamount to regulating who people are allowed to become—
including how we think, feel, behave, and are perceived by others. As 
the history of restrictions on reproductive technologies illustrates, 
government should not interfere with deeply personal decisions 
regarding one’s own body and mind in order to enforce contested 
views of morality. 
In concluding, I argue that rather than expanding our reliance 
on moral concerns in regulating medical technologies, the United 
States would be better served by purging its existing medical 
regulation of morality-based intrusions, whether latent or overt, and 
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recommitting itself to regulating medicine for the purpose of 
protecting human health. 
I. IDENTITY-MODIFYING INTERVENTIONS AND THEIR 
DISCONTENTS 
A. Our Identities Are Increasingly Susceptible to Modification by 
Biological Interventions 
The United States’ systems of medical regulation have long 
distinguished between two types of uses of biological interventions: 
therapeutic practices aimed at treating or preventing disease and 
disability, and the “recreational” use of psychotropic drugs. But 
there is another set of practices that does not rest comfortably in 
either of these categories: the use of biomedical interventions to 
enhance or otherwise modify certain features of healthy bodies 
and brains. 
Although some of these practices date back to prehistoric times, 
new technologies have expanded the range of potential modifications 
and growing medical consumerism has spurred demand for them. 
Today people can use biomedical interventions to shape an ever-
expanding range of physiological and psychological traits, changing 
how we appear to others and how we feel, behave, and think. These 
practices have become so ubiquitous that it is easy to overlook this 
increasingly prominent feature of American culture: the use of 
medical interventions as tools for forging our identities.5 
These practices take many different forms and raise concerns that 
differ in both degree and type. Grouping them together is not 
intended to deny these differences, but to highlight what these 
seemingly disparate practices share in common: all of them can have 
profound (even if not necessarily equally profound) implications for 
individuals’ sense of identity. It is often precisely that potential that 
worries critics and motivates proposals to regulate these practices on 
moral grounds. 
 
 5.  ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 52–53 (“Enhancement technologies have become part of 
‘the governance of the soul’ . . . the management of meaning through the management of 
the self.”). 
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1. Beauty 
In 2012, Americans spent some $11 billion to receive more than 
fourteen million cosmetic procedures—nearly triple the number of 
reconstructive procedures performed in the same period.6 While 
cosmetic interventions are often dismissed as vain trivialities, 
enhancing one’s attractiveness can yield tangible benefits. People 
who are perceived as attractive tend to get better grades in school, 
earn higher incomes, and receive shorter prison sentences than their 
less attractive peers.7 
But the demand for cosmetic procedures is not merely, or even 
primarily, driven by the pursuit of positional advantages. The growth 
of cosmetic surgery also illustrates “the tightening relationship 
between the body and self-identity.”8 As philosopher Carl Elliott 
writes, cosmetic interventions can play an important role in gaining 
social affirmation of one’s chosen identity, by altering one’s outward 
appearance to match his internal sense of self. Drawing on Charles 
Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity, Elliott argues that “identity can 
never be wholly inwardly generated. It must be developed in 
dialogue with others.”9 Modifying one’s appearance can be a way of 
ensuring that one’s chosen identity will be affirmed when standing in 
front of the “social mirror.”10 
For example, Kathy Davis’ Reshaping the Female Body describes a 
woman who explained her decision to have a breast reduction by 
pointing to a disjuncture between the way she thought of herself and 
the way others perceived her.11 “Big breasts are supposed to be sexy,” 
 
 6.  AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLASTIC SURGEONS, 2012 PLASTIC SURGERY STATISTICS 
REPORT 5–6 (2012). 
 7.  Timothy Judge et al., Does It Pay to Be Smart, Attractive, or Confident (or All 
Three)? Relationships Among General Mental Ability, Physical Attractiveness, Core Self-
Evaluations, and Income, 94 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 742, 744–55 (2009); Andrea DeSantis & 
Wesley Kayson, Defendants’ Characteristics of Attractiveness, Race, and Sex and Sentencing 
Decisions, PSYCHOL. REP. 81, 679–83 (1997); Irene Frieze et al., Attractiveness and Income for 
Men and Women in Management, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1039, 1039–57 (1991); John 
Salvia et al., Attractiveness and School Achievement, 15 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 60 (1977). 
 8.  CHRIS SHILLING, THE BODY AND SOCIAL THEORY 9 (1993). 
 9.  ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 41 (citing CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF 
AUTHENTICITY 47–48 (1991)). 
 10. Id. at 42. 
 11.  KATHY DAVIS, RESHAPING THE FEMALE BODY: THE DILEMMA OF COSMETIC 
SURGERY 77–78 (1995). 
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she explained. “So you get to be a sex bomb whether you want to be 
or not.”12 Her breast reduction allowed her to conform her outward 
appearance to her internal sense of her identity as “the small-breasted 
type.”13 Similarly, in his memoir Muscle, Sam Fussell describes 
becoming drawn to steroids as a means of ensuring that others 
would recognize his chosen identity as a bodybuilder.14 As Fussell 
explains, “If who you are is what you do, and as a bodybuilder, what 
you do is what you look like, then . . . I was distinctly in trouble, 
because I didn’t look like a bodybuilder.”15 While Fussell participated 
in bodybuilding competitions, by his own telling “I was concerned 
far less with competition than with self-identity. As long as the part I 
played was simply interior, I felt like a fraud.”16 
2. Race and ethnicity 
Although racial categories are social, not biological facts, people 
can and do use biological interventions to change how others 
perceive their race. Like other features of identity, race is constructed 
through dialogue between individuals and the broader society.17 This 
dialogue creates spaces within which individuals can engage in what 
Snow and Anderson have called “identity work,” deploying various 
strategies to construct racial identities and to have them recognized 
by others.18 These strategies can include selectively associating with 
people of the individual’s chosen race, highlighting or downplaying 
certain cultural symbols, and selectively disclosing information about 
one’s racial heritage.19 However, because perceptions of race are 
tightly connected to physical appearance, “if one’s phenotype differs 
significantly from socially constructed notions of what members of a 
 
 12.  Id. at 77. 
 13.  Id. at 78. 
 14.  SAMUEL WILSON FUSSELL, MUSCLE: CONFESSIONS OF AN UNLIKELY 
BODYBUILDER (2015)). 
 15.  Id. at 122. 
 16.  Id at 123. 
 17.  Nikki Khanna & Cathryn Johnson, Passing as Black: Racial Identity Work Among 
Biracial Americans, 73 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 380, 383 (2010) (“[R]ace and identity arise out of 
a social process in which meanings are created and modified through social interaction 
with others.”). 
 18.  David A. Snow & Leon Anderson, Identity Work Among the Homeless: The Verbal 
Construction and Avowal of Personal Identities, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1336 (1987). 
 19.  Khanna & Johnson, supra note 17, at 381. 
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particular race are expected to look like, they have considerable 
difficulty asserting that racial identity no matter what identity 
strategy they employ.”20 Accordingly, one of the most important 
ways individuals manage their racial identities is by changing how 
they look. 
Racial and ethnic minorities have long used biological 
interventions to obscure their heritage and assimilate into American 
culture.21 In the early twentieth century, scores of Jews—and other 
immigrants who feared being mistaken for Jews—sought out surgery 
to hide “the so-called Jewish nose, a term that had found its way 
into popular currency by the 1920s.”22 After World War II, many 
Asian Americans began pursuing eyelid surgery to “westernize” their 
eyes.23 And for many years some African Americans have used 
cosmetics and creams to lighten their skin—sometimes incurring 
serious health risks in the process.24 
More recently, it has become increasingly common for people to 
use cosmetic interventions not to assimilate into white culture, but 
to accentuate their identities as racial minorities.25 Research by 
Khanna and Johnson suggests many biracial individuals are 
“modifying their phenotypes to pass as black or to accent their black 
ancestry”—by, for example, using skin tanning.26 Similarly, plastic 
surgeons are witnessing a shift among the preferences of immigrants 
to the United States. “Rather than striving to fit in to their new 
country, many immigrants reshape themselves to their home 
 
 20.  Id. at 389. 
 21.  ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 164. 
 22.  Id. at 190. In 1936, the founder of the American Board of Plastic Surgery argued 
“[c]hange in the shape of the pronounced Jewish nose may be sought for either social or 
business reasons.” Id. at 191. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  See, e.g., Catherine Saint Louis, Creams Offering Lighter Skin May Bring Risks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, at A1 (describing the story of Allison Ross, who used skin lightening 
creams “to be more accepted in society.” The cream made her “fairer,” but also made her skin 
“so thin that a touch would bruise her face. Her capillaries became visible, and she developed 
stubborn acne.”). 
 25.  Khanna & Johnson, supra note 17, at 386 (“identity work is not just about 
concealing or covering a stigmatized identity, but highlighting a non-stigmatized or preferred 
identity, or what we term accenting.”). 
 26.  Id. at 387. 
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culture’s trends and tastes.”27 The president of the Long Island 
Plastic Surgical Group refers to plastic surgeons as “amateur 
sociologists,” claiming that he can guess which procedures patients 
will request based on their ethnic background and age.28 
3. Sex 
“A person’s sexual anatomy, and hence that person’s sense of 
sexual self, is core to an individual’s self-definition.”29 Although most 
people identify with their biological sex—or the sex “assigned” to 
them at birth by virtue of their physiological attributes—some 
people experience a profound discordance between their biological 
sex and their sense of their own sexual and gender identities.30 In her 
memoir, Conundrum, Jan Morris reports that when she was a young 
boy she felt that she had been “born into the wrong body, and 
should really be a girl.”31 Morris describes feeling “deprived of an 
identity” as a man.32 But after undergoing sex reassignment surgery, 
she felt able “to live as myself, to clothe myself in a more proper 
body, and achieve Identity at last.”33 
Like many others before and after her, Morris used medical 
interventions to conform her physical attributes to her internal sense 
of identity as a woman. Female-to-male transsexuals can use surgical 
procedures to have their breasts removed and genitals reshaped, and 
can take testosterone to increase their musculature, to grow facial 
and body hair, and to deepen their voices.34 Male-to-female 
transsexuals may obtain breast implants, surgery to reshape their 
genitals, and/or estrogen to help produce a more typically female 
 
 27.  Sam Dolnick, Ethnic Differences Emerge in Plastic Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2011, at A17. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Chai R. Feldblum, The Right to Define One’s Own Concept of Existence: What 
Lawrence Can Mean for Intersex and Transgender People, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 115, 
124 (2006). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  JAN MORRIS, CONUNDRUM 3 (1974). 
 32.  Id. at 40. 
 33.  Id. at 104. 
 34.  Female to Male Transsexuals: Gender Reassignment and FTM Surgery, Transitioning 
Guide, FEMALETOMALE.ORG, www.femaletomale.org/ftm-transitioning-guide/ (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2015). 
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body shape.35 Some trans-females also use surgical procedures—such 
as crico-thyroid approximation and laser-assisted voice adjustment—
to raise the pitch of their voices by shortening or thinning their 
vocal cords.36 
4. Intelligence 
Many people take drugs to improve their cognitive performance. 
The drugs most commonly used for these purposes include 
stimulants like Ritalin and Adderall, which are marketed as 
treatments for attention deficit disorders, and Provigil, which is 
approved as a treatment for sleep disorders.37 “Several other 
compounds with different pharmacological actions are in early 
clinical trials, having shown positive effects on memory in healthy 
research subjects.”38 
Although these drugs are marketed as treatments for illnesses, 
they are increasingly used to enhance cognition among healthy 
individuals.39 According to one survey, “almost 7% of students in US 
universities have used prescription stimulants in this way, and . . . on 
some campuses, up to 25% of students had used them in the past 
year.”40 These students are not alone. Media accounts are filled with 
stories of academics, military personnel, professional poker players, 
 
 35.  The Philadelphia Center for Transgender Surgery, MALE-TO-FEMALE, 
www.thetransgendercenter.com/index.php/maletofemale1.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
 36.  ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 22. 
 37.  Hank Greely et al., Towards Responsible Use of Cognitive-enhancing Drugs by the 
Healthy, 456 NATURE 702, 702 (2008). 
 38.  Id.; see also Peter J. Whitehouse et al., Enhancing Cognition in the Intellectually 
Intact, 27 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 14, 22 (1997) (“Our ability to treat dementia and other 
brain-based disorders is improving, and these developments will likely lead to pharmaceutical 
tools to increase cognition in humans who are not suffering from a clinical condition causing 
cognitive impairment.”). 
 39.  Barbara Sahakian & Sharon Morein-Zamir, Professor’s Little Helper, 450 NATURE 
1157, 1157 (2007) (“off-label and non-prescription use by the general public is becoming 
increasingly commonplace”); M. Elizabeth Smith & Martha J. Farah, Are Prescription 
Stimulants “Smart Pills”? The Epidemiology and Cognitive Neuroscience of Prescription 
Stimulant Use by Normal Healthy Individuals, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 717 (2011) (summarizing 
research on the prevalence of nonmedical use of prescription stimulants). 
 40.  Greely et al., supra note 37, at 702. 
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and Wall Street bankers using drugs to boost intelligence 
and performance.41 
But while there is ongoing research into new drugs that could 
enhance intelligence,42 there is little evidence that this is what 
existing drugs actually accomplish.43 Rather, research suggests that 
users are not taking these drugs to enhance their brains’ processing 
power or memory, but to change aspects of their personalities in 
ways that are conducive to performing intellectual tasks—reducing 
daydreaming, enhancing self-control, and increasing one’s interest in 
intellectual work.44 
In a 2012 study, Dr. Ilina Singh conducted a series of interviews 
with children taking ADHD drugs to determine “the implications of 
stimulant drug use for key dimensions of children’s moral identity.”45 
While most of the children did not feel that the drugs made them 
different people, many parents reported sentiments like “[h]e’s like a 
different person on medication” or “I feel like I hardly recognize her 
now that she has started taking the medication.”46 The children’s 
 
 41.  Brendan Maher, Poll Results – Look Who’s Doping, 452 NATURE 674, 674 (2008) 
(reporting that one in five readers of Nature—generally academic researchers—who responded 
to the journal’s informal poll reported using stimulants for nonmedical purposes, in particular, 
to enhance their focus and concentration); Sahakian & Morein-Zamir, supra note 39, at 1158 
(“Cognitive-enhancing drugs are increasingly being used in non-medical situations such as 
shift work and by active military personnel.”); Karen Kaplan & Denise Gellene, They’re Bulking 
up Mentally, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/20/science/sci-braindoping20 (professional poker 
player Paul Phillips “credited the attention deficit drug Adderall and the narcolepsy pill 
Provigil with helping him earn more than $2.3 million as a poker player.”); Robert Kolker, The 
Real Limitless Drug Isn’t Just for Lifehackers Anymore, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 31, 2013), 
http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/modafinil-2013-4/; Alexis Madrigal, 20 Percent of 
Scientists Admit Using Brain-Enhancing Drugs — Do You?, WIRED (Apr. 9, 2008), 
www.wired.com/2008/04/20-of-scientist/. 
 42.  Greely et al., supra note 37. 
 43.  See, e.g., Smith & Farah, supra note 39 (cataloging and summarizing clinical studies 
on whether stimulants improve performance on tests designed to assess various aspects of 
cognition; the results were mixed, with evidence generally pointing to modest 
enhancing effects). 
 44.  Scott Vrecko, Just How Cognitive Is “Cognitive Enhancement”? On the Significance 
of Emotions in University Students’ Experiences with Study Drugs, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS 
NEUROSCIENCE 4 (2013). 
 45.  ILINA SINGH, VOICES: VOICES ON IDENTITY, CHILDHOOD, ETHICS AND 
STIMULANTS 4 (2012), www.adhdvoices.com/documents/12_0819_Voices_Report_LR-
72dpi-GREY_V4.pdf. 
 46.  Id. at 24. 
03.LAMKIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  3:21 PM 
501 Regulating Identity  
 513 
own descriptions of these drugs’ effects emphasized their emotional 
and behavioral changes. Many reported that stimulants reduced the 
amount of time they spent daydreaming, which helped them 
improve their organization and increased their opportunities and 
desire for socializing.47 
In another recent study, many healthy college students who take 
stimulants to improve academic performance asserted that the drugs 
did not make them smarter.48 Rather, study participants emphasized 
the way these drugs changed their personalities, including their levels 
of motivation and interest in engaging in intellectual work.49 Many 
students reported feeling more motivated to do work when taking 
stimulants, with some describing feeling “driven” to work and others 
reporting feeling more “stressed” about the importance of finishing 
projects.50 Students also expressed feeling more interested in their 
academic work when under the influence of stimulants. Some 
reported that their work became “less tedious,” “something that was 
sort of fun” or even “exciting.”51 
As they became more engaged in their academic work, many 
students became less interested in other endeavors, such as 
socializing or web surfing.52 Another study found that stimulants 
increased participants’ willingness to delay gratification, finding that 
when subjects were given amphetamines they were more willing to 
wait for a larger monetary reward rather than settling for a smaller 
amount immediately.53 
In sum, the widespread use of so-called “smart pills” appears to 
extend well beyond merely enhancing intelligence. Rather, “these 
enhancements may well be changes critical to a person’s identity, a 
 
 47.  Id. at 24, 37. 
 48.  Vrecko, supra note 44, at 10. 
 49. Id.; see also Joshua Foer, The Adderall Me: My Romance with ADHD Meds, SLATE 
(May 10, 2005), 
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2005/05/the_adderall_me.ht
ml (“I didn’t feel like I was becoming smarter or even like I was thinking more clearly. I just 
felt more directed, less distracted by rogue thoughts, less day-dreamy.”). 
 50.  Vrecko, supra note 44, at 7–8. 
 51.  Id. at 9. 
 52.  Id. at 8. 
 53.  Maia Szalavitz, Popping Smart Pills: The Case for Cognitive Enhancement, TIME, 
(Jan. 6, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1869435,00.html. 
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person’s sense of who he or she is.”54 Users report significant 
changes to their self-control and impulsivity, their tendency to 
daydream, and even their interest in activities like socializing and 
engaging in intellectual work. 
5. Personality 
Antidepressants like Prozac and Paxil are among the most 
prescribed drugs in the United States.55 From 1988 to 2008, 
antidepressant prescriptions rose by nearly 400 percent.56 According 
to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 12 
percent of Americans aged twelve years and over—and more than 22 
percent of women aged forty to fifty-nine—take 
antidepressant medications.57 
Most of these people are not clinically depressed. The CDC 
estimates that about eight percent of all Americans over age twelve 
took antidepressant medication, despite having “no current 
depressive symptoms.”58 No doubt many of these people use 
antidepressants to treat anxiety disorders and other ailments. But in 
Listening to Prozac, psychiatrist Peter Kramer offered another reason 
for the enormous popularity of the drug: “its ability to 
alter personality.”59 
Kramer describes his numerous experiences prescribing 
antidepressants to people who did not meet the diagnostic criteria 
for depression, but who simply liked themselves better—indeed, felt 
more “like themselves”—on these drugs. For a significant minority 
of Kramer’s patients, “Prozac seemed to give social confidence to the 
habitually timid, to make the sensitive brash, to lend the introvert 
 
 54.  ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 257. 
 55.  See, e.g., Brendan L. Smith, Inappropriate Prescribing, 43 AM. PSYCHOL. ASSOC. 36, 
37 (2012) (antidepressants are the second most commonly prescribed drug in the United 
States, just after cholesterol-lowering drugs); CDC: Antidepressants Most Prescribed Drugs in 
U.S., CNN.COM (July 9, 2007), www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/07/09/antidepressants/. 
 56.  Laura A. Pratt et al., Antidepressant Use in Persons Aged 12 and Over: United States, 
2005–2008, NCHS Data Brief (Oct. 2011), www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db76.pdf. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  PETER D. KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC: THE LANDMARK BOOK ABOUT 
ANTIDEPRESSANTS AND THE REMAKING OF THE SELF 10 (rev. ed. 1997). 
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the social skills of a salesman.”60 About a patient called “Tess,” 
Kramer reports: 
Here was a patient whose usual method of functioning changed 
dramatically. She became socially capable, no longer a wallflower 
but a social butterfly. Where once she had focused on obligations 
to others, now she was vivacious and fun-loving. Before, she had 
pined after men; now she dated them, enjoyed them, weighed their 
faults and virtues.61 
Kramer viewed this use of antidepressants as a kind of analog to 
cosmetic surgery, coining the phrase “cosmetic 
psychopharmacology” to capture the use of chemicals “to modify 
personality in useful, attractive ways.”62 
Others have turned to different drugs to alter their personalities. 
By his own account, actor Cary Grant was “horrendous”—an “utter 
fake, a self-opinionated bore, a know-all who knew very little.”63 But 
then Grant reported that “I have been through a psychiatric 
experience which has completely changed me,” a process he 
described as being “born again.”64 Grant had not found religion, but 
LSD, a drug he claimed to have ingested more than sixty times. 
Grant reported that his experiences on the drug had transformed 
him, stripping him of the “defenses, hypocrisies and vanities” that 
previously had plagued him.65 
Burgeoning clinical research into the effects of psychedelic 
substances corroborates anecdotal accounts like Grant’s. Researchers 
at Johns Hopkins recently reported the results of two double-
blinded, placebo-controlled studies in which healthy participants 
with no history of using hallucinogenic drugs were given psilocybin, 
a psychedelic compound similar to LSD.66 Notwithstanding a large 
body of evidence showing that core personality traits change very 
 
 60.  Id. at 18–19. 
 61.  Id. at 10–11. 
 62.  Id. at 15. 
 63.  JAY STEVENS, STORMING HEAVEN: LSD AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 64–
65 (1980). 
 64.  Id. at 65. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Katherine A. MacLean et al., Mystical Experiences Occasioned by the Hallucinogen 
Psilocybin Lead to Increases in the Personality Domain of Openness, 25 J. 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1453 (2011). 
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little across the lifespan, the authors found that a single dose of 
psilocybin produced “fundamental changes in personal concerns, 
goals, and identity”—changes that endured more than a year after 
ingesting the drug.67 The authors found that these changes “were 
larger in magnitude than changes in personality typically observed in 
healthy adults over decades of life experience”—larger than increases 
produced by successful treatment with antidepressants, and 
comparable to another study involving “hundreds of hours of 
solitary meditation over the course of 3 months.”68 
6. Spirituality 
The Hopkins studies not only suggested lasting personality 
changes, they proposed a psychological mechanism for these 
changes: mystical experiences. Not only did study participants who 
ingested psilocybin have mystical experiences, sixty-seven percent 
rated their experience as “either the single most meaningful 
experience of his or her life or among the top five most meaningful 
experiences of his or her life,” comparable to “the birth of a first 
child or death of a parent.”69 Moreover, participants’ judgments 
about the meaningfulness of these experiences had not diminished 
when they were assessed more than a year after their session.70 
While research into the effects of various drugs on spirituality is 
blossoming, the phenomenon is ancient. Psilocybin itself “has been 
used as a sacrament for centuries, possibly millennia, in structured 
religious ceremonies.”71 Indigenous inhabitants of the Americas have 
long used psychedelic compounds found in plants, such as peyote 
and ayahuasca, to induce spiritual transformations—practices that 
continue to this day.72 Although these substances are banned under 
 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 1457. 
 69.  R. R. Griffiths et al., Psilocybin Can Occasion Mystical-Type Experiences Having 
Substantial and Sustained Personal Meaning and Spiritual Significance, 187 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 268, 276–77 (2006). 
 70.  R. R. Griffiths et al., Mystical-Type Experiences Occasioned by Psilocybin Mediate the 
Attribution of Personal Meaning and Spiritual Significance 14 months later, 22 J. 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 621, 631 (2008). 
 71.  Id. at 621. 
 72.  See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418 (2006). 
03.LAMKIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  3:21 PM 
501 Regulating Identity  
 517 
the Controlled Substances Act, the U.S. government has carved out 
exceptions for their use by certain indigenous groups, in recognition 
of the importance of these drugs to their religious practices.73 
The use of biological interventions to induce spiritual 
experiences or express spirituality includes surgical interventions as 
well. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, surgical removal of the 
foreskin is the foundation of God’s covenant with Abraham.74 In 
medieval times, devout penitents in Europe satisfied their desire to 
transcend the flesh by devising horrific tortures that left their bodies 
grotesquely deformed.75 Several native North American tribes 
practiced forms of ritual “hookswinging,” in which participants were 
suspended in the air by hooks skewered through the flesh of their 
backs. In the Mandan’s O-Kee-Pa ceremony, this practice was 
undertaken as a ritual of rebirth and initiation into manhood.76 
Among the Blackfoot, the flesh that tore from the skin through this 
ritual was offered as a sacrifice to the Sun.77 
7. Memory 
When Shakespeare’s Macbeth begs his royal physician to soothe 
his wife’s conscience by “plucking” out her troubling memories, the 
physician responds, “[t]herein the patient [m]ust minister to 
himself.”78 But new research suggests future doctors may be able to 
do better. Neuroscientists are making surprising gains in their ability 
to dampen, erase, and even create specific memories.79 
 
 73.  Id. at 420. 
 74.  Genesis 17:9–14 (King James) (“Then God said to Abraham . . . ‘you shall be 
circumcised . . . and it shall be a token of the covenant betwixt me and you.’”). 
 75.  SHILLING, supra note 8, at 191. 
 76.  W. C. MacLeod, The Nature, Origin, and Linkages of the Rite of Hookswinging: 
With Special Reference to North America, ANTHROPOS INSTITUT, Jan.–Apr. 1934 at 1, 1–38. 
 77.  Id. at 5. 
 78. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 3. 
“Canst thou not minister to a mind diseas’d, 
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow, 
Raze out the written troubles of the brain, 
And with some sweet oblivious antidote 
Cleanse the stuff’d bosom of that perilous stuff 
Which weighs upon the heart?” Id. 
 79.  Raül Andero et al., Amygdala-Dependent Fear Is Regulated by Oprl1 in Mice and 
Humans with PTSD, 5 SCI. TRANSL. MED. 1 (2013); Adam Piore, Totaling Recall, 22 SCI. 
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Much of this research is directed at treating or preventing post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by dampening traumatic memories. 
Some studies suggest that administering drugs like Propranolol to a 
victim shortly after a traumatic event can interfere with the 
consolidation of memories of the event, reducing the likelihood of 
developing PTSD.80 More interesting, and potentially troubling, is 
research suggesting the potential to erase specific memories at any 
time. “Memory reconsolidation” theory hypothesizes that the act of 
recalling a memory temporarily places it in an unstable state, during 
which time it may be possible to modify or erase the memory.81 At 
least one set of researchers tested this hypothesis on humans, using 
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) to temporarily impair distressing 
memories.82 Researchers first showed subjects two disturbing slide 
shows depicting traumatic stories—a physical assault and a car 
accident.83 Later, they prompted subjects to recall one of the two 
stories and then administered ECT while the subjects’ memories of 
that story were “reactivated.” When the subjects were tested the 
next day, they performed no better than chance in trying to recall 
the details of the “reactivated” story.84 Their memories of the other 
story were unaffected.85 
 
AM. MIND 40 (2012); Roger K. Pitman et al., Pilot Study of Secondary Prevention of 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder with Propranolol, 51 SOC. BIOL. PSYCHOL. 189 (2002); Benedict 
Carey, Brain Researchers Open Door to Editing Memory, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2009), 
www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/health/research/06brain.html; Meredith Cohn, Method to 
Erase Traumatic Memories May Be on the Horizon, BALT. SUN, Nov. 22, 2010, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-11-22/health/bs-hs-erasing-memories-
20101122_1_fearful-memory-proteins-researchers; Katie Drummond, No Fear: Memory 
Adjustment Pills Get Pentagon Push, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2011, 2:00 PM), 
www.wired.com/2011/12/fear-erasing-drugs/; Alison Winter, Should We Erase Painful 
Memories?, SALON (Dec. 31, 2011), 
www.salon.com/2011/12/31/should_we_erase_painful_memories/. 
 80.  Andero et al., supra note 79; Pitman et al., supra note 79. 
 81.  Piore, supra note 79. 
 82.  Marijn C W Kroes et al., An Electroconvulsive Therapy Procedure Impairs 
Reconsolidation of Episodic Memories in Humans, 17 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 204 (2014); 
Piore, supra note 79; Jonah Lehrer, The Forgetting Pill Erases Painful Memories Forever, 
WIRED (Feb. 17, 2012), www.wired.com/magazine/2012/02/ff_forgettingpill/all/1. 
 83.  Helen Shen, Zapping the Brain Can Help to Spot-clean Nasty Memories, NATURE 
(Dec. 22, 2013), www.nature.com/news/zapping-the-brain-can-help-to-spot-clean-nasty-
memories-1.14431. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
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Perhaps most intriguing, other research has demonstrated the 
ability to implant false memories in mice using optogenetics, a 
method that uses light to activate specific brain cells.86 Researchers 
placed mice in a chamber and shocked them, conditioning the mice 
to associate that chamber with the shock. Later, when they placed 
the mice in a different chamber, the mice did not freeze in fear—
until researchers used light to activate the memory cells connected to 
the first chamber. Then the mice did freeze, appearing to incorrectly 
recall that the second, harmless chamber was where they had 
been shocked. 
The ability to erase or modify memory would have profound 
implications for identity. As Adam Kolber observes: 
Memory and identity are closely linked. We feel a special 
connection to our past selves largely because were remember 
having our past experiences . . . While memory is not the sole 
constituent of personal identity, it creates much of the 
psychological continuity that makes us aware of our continuing 
existence over time.87 
While memory-modifying interventions might gain regulatory 
approval as treatments for PTSD, once approved they could also be 
used to ease guilty consciences or eliminate memories of other 
painful or embarrassing events.88 
B. Key Concerns About Identity-modifying Interventions 
As we develop powerful new technologies for modifying bodies 
and minds, discomfort with these practices is growing—in the 
popular press and among policymakers, doctors, and ethicists. 
Medical ethics and legal literature is teeming with books and articles 
raising ethical concerns about enhancement practices.89 In its most 
 
 86.  Liu et al., Optogenetic Stimulation of a Hippocampal Engram Activates Fear 
Memory Recall, 484 NATURE 381 (2012); Ramirez et al., Creating a False Memory in the 
Hippocampus, 341 SCI. 387 (2013); Elizabeth Landau, Scientists give mice false memories, 
CNN (July 25, 2013), www.cnn.com/2013/07/25/health/mouse-brain-memory. 
 87.  Adam Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Memory 
Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1601 (2006) (internal citation omitted). 
 88.  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND 
THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 207 (2003) [hereinafter BEYOND THERAPY]. 
 89.  See, e.g., id.; NICK BOSTROM & JULIAN SAVULESCU, HUMAN ENHANCEMENT 1–22 
(2008); LEON KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY, AND DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR 
 
03.LAMKIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  3:21 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
520 
recent Ten-Year Forecast, the Institute for the Future, a Palo Alto 
think tank, focused on the “enormous potential for chaos” from 
unbridled human enhancement and emphasized the need “to make 
explicit the rights and restrictions that would apply to the rapidly-
growing set of cognitive enhancement technologies.”90 News stories 
and popular books about these practices and their hazards—the 
exploding use of ADHD drugs by healthy students, the over-use of 
antidepressants, skin lightening by celebrities like Michael Jackson 
and Sammy Sosa, the prospect of memory erasure—have 
become ubiquitous.91 
A 2007 report by the British Medical Association warned that 
[m]any techniques that involve attempts to modify or improve 
aspects of ourselves or others are seen as ethically problematic . . . 
[P]articular concerns arise from interference with the brain 
precisely because it is intrinsically linked with our personality and 
individuality and because the long-term effects of interfering with 
this very complex system are unknown.92 
Britain’s Academy of Medical Sciences, the British Academy, the 
Royal Academy of Engineering, and the Royal Society have 
 
BIOETHICS (2008); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE 
AGE OF GENETIC ENGINEERING (2007); Henry T. Greely, Remarks on Human Enhancement, 
56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1139 (2007–2008); I. Glenn Cohen, What (If Anything) Is Wrong with 
Human Enhancement? What (If Anything) Is Right with It?, 49 TULSA L. REV. 645 (2014). 
 90.  Jamais Cascio, Magna Cortica, OPEN THE FUTURE (May 13, 2014, 12:33 PM), 
www.openthefuture.com/2014/05/magna_cortica.html. 
 91.  KATHERINE SHARPE, COMING OF AGE ON ZOLOFT: HOW ANTIDEPRESSANTS 
CHEERED US UP, LET US DOWN, AND CHANGED WHO WE ARE (2012) (describing the 
author’s experiences taking antidepressants and her concerns about their effects on her identity 
and relationships); Carey, supra note 79; Enrique Rojas, Sammy Sosa: Facial Cream Caused 
Lightening of Skin, ESPN (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4642952; Alan Schwarz, Risky Rise of the 
Good Grade Pill, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2012, 
www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/education/seeking-academic-edge-teenagers-abuse-
stimulants.html; Thomas Watkins, Michael Jackson Had Dozens Of Skin-Whitening Creams, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 26, 2010), www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/26/michael-
jackson-had-dozen_n_515528.html. 
 92.  BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, BOOSTING YOUR BRAINPOWER: ETHICAL 
ASPECTS OF COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENTS 3 (2007), http://enhancingresponsibility.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Boosting_brainpower_tcm41-147266.pdf. 
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expressed similar concerns.93 On this side of the Atlantic, President 
George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics warned of this trend in a 
lengthy report entitled Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit 
of Happiness. The Council argued that although “[a]lcohol, 
marijuana, cocaine, and other consciousness-affecting drugs offer 
temporary pleasures and escapes, and they can surely alter behavior 
and sense of self,” newer biotechnologies are more troubling because 
of “their capacity for more precise, long-term, and sought-after 
alterations in the human psyche.”94 President Obama’s Commission 
for the Study of Bioethical Issues recently studied the “pressing 
ethical issues concerning equitable access to enhancements and their 
benefits, appropriate management of risks, and obligations and 
freedoms to enhance or not.”95 
Critics of enhancement argue these practices raise a host of 
concerns, most of which do not apply to therapeutic uses of medical 
technology. Many of these concerns relate to parents subjecting their 
children to medical interventions for purposes other than treating 
illnesses—to make them smarter or stronger or taller. Others relate 
to interventions forced upon unwilling adults, such as involuntary 
behavior modification for prisoners. These situations raise difficult 
issues—particularly surrounding consent—that are unique to those 
contexts, and that others have ably explored elsewhere.96 This article 
instead focuses on the use of identity-modifying technologies by 
consenting adults. Within that context, critics have raised three 
primary concerns beyond the current system’s focus on protecting 
 
 93.  THE ACADEMY OF MEDICAL SCIENCES ET AL., HUMAN ENHANCEMENT AND THE 
FUTURE OF WORK [hereinafter HUMAN ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF WORK] (2012), 
https://www.acmedsci.ac.uk/viewFile/publicationDownloads/135228646747.pdf. 
 94.  BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 208–09. 
 95.  PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, GRAY 
MATTERS: INTEGRATIVE APPROACHES FOR NEUROSCIENCE, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 8 (May 
2014), www.bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/Gray%20Matters%20Vol%201.pdf. 
 96.  See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994) (examining, e.g., whether limitations should be 
placed on genetic enhancement of offspring); Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal 
Justice: Not Responsibility but Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103 (2008) (discussing legal 
and ethical considerations raised by “treating” criminality with medical interventions); Jack M. 
Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843, 844 
(2007); Andrew B. Coan, Is There a Constitutional Right to Select the Genes of One’s Offspring?, 
63 HASTINGS L.J. 233 (2011); Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. Rev. 
1373 (1995). 
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users’ health: fairness, agency, and authenticity.97 While there is 
considerable debate over the validity of these concerns, the purpose 
of the remainder of this section is to describe these concerns, rather 
than to critically analyze them. The argument offered in this paper is 
that even if one accepts that enhancements raise important ethical 
concerns, restricting access to these interventions on contested moral 
grounds is bad policy. 
1. Fairness and coercion 
Some worry about the use of identity-modifying interventions as 
tools to obtain positional advantages. This concern is most obvious 
in the context of sports, where athletes have long used steroids, 
human growth hormone, EPO, beta blockers, stimulants, and a host 
of other drugs to improve their performance. Sports associations at 
every level have sought to ban athletes from using performance 
enhancing drugs, in large part because they are perceived to give 
users unfair advantages.98 Even outside the realm of athletics, life is 
full of competitions in which biology can confer competitive 
advantages. Given the many benefits of being perceived as attractive, 
using cosmetic surgery to enhance appearance can boost one’s 
prospects in countless endeavors.99 Some argue that healthy students 
who use stimulants as study aids may gain unfair advantages in 
pursuing academic achievement—advantages that may help them get 
into better colleges or secure better jobs.100 
These advantages will likely be unevenly distributed according to 
wealth.101 “Enhancement technologies . . . are expensive and are 
 
 97.  Critics have raised a host of other concerns as well, including objecting to the 
perceived “unnaturalness” of these interventions, their potential to erode social solidarity, and 
their tendency to undermine our sense of “openness to the unbidden.” KASS, supra note 89; 
Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and Law in FDA 
Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1135, 1146–58 (2005); Sandel, supra note 89. 
 98.  World Anti-Doping Agency, Code Signatories, www.wada-ama.org/en/World-Anti-
Doping-Program/Sports-and-Anti-Doping-Organizations/The-Code/Code-Acceptance/ 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2015) (listing the sport organizations that have adopted WADA’s anti-
doping code). WADA’s motto is “play true.” 
 99.  See sources cited supra note 7. 
 100.  Schwarz, supra note 91. 
 101.  Eric Racine & Judy Illes, Neuroethical Responsibilities, 33 CAN. J. NEUROLOGICAL. 
SCI. 269, 271 (2006) (“enhancement could jeopardize distributive justice and cloud the 
meaning of medical intervention in modern societies”); see also Nick Bostrom & Anders 
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likely to remain so.”102 The health insurance that most Americans 
rely on to pay for medical interventions covers treatments for many 
illnesses, but does not pay for interventions that are not considered 
medically necessary.103 For example, insurers generally will pay for 
stimulants to treat attention deficit disorders, but they will not cover 
these drugs simply because a student feels she studies more 
effectively when taking them. If a cognitive enhancement were 
highly effective but unevenly distributed according to wealth, 
wealthy individuals could compound their advantages while the 
disadvantaged fell further behind.104 
This concern about fairness gives rise to a related concern about 
coercion, or pressure to use biological interventions to compete for 
grades, jobs, and romantic partners. In some cases that pressure may 
be overt. For example, soldiers in the United States’ military can be 
legally required to take stimulants to promote alertness and enhance 
their performance.105 One can imagine other circumstances in which 
employers—or even workplace safety regulations—might require 
healthy employees to use medical interventions to improve 
performance or promote safety. In 2008, Hank Greely and co-
authors suggested that if there were very safe drugs that improved 
surgeons’ performance, it might be appropriate to require doctors to 
take these drugs when performing risky operations.106 
Even in the absence of explicit requirements to enhance, 
employers or schools could implement performance requirements 
that are difficult to meet without medical interventions.107 Many 
 
Sandberg, Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges, 15 SCI. & 
ENGINEERING ETHICS 311, 331 (2009) (“[A]ccess to enhancers is often dependent on being 
able to find an open-minded physician who will prescribe the drug. This creates inequities in 
access. People with high social capital and good information get access while others 
are excluded.”). 
 102.  HUMAN ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF WORK, supra note 93, at 44. 
 103.  NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 150 (2007). 
 104.  HUMAN ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF WORK, supra note 93, at 44. 
 105.  Greely et al., supra note 37, at 703. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  HUMAN ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF WORK, supra note 93, at 45 (“For 
example, expectations on lorry drivers could in future be based on the number of hours for 
which their awareness levels are sufficient with the use of a cognitive enhancer. Or individuals 
in labour-intensive jobs, perhaps baggage handlers or construction workers, could be required 
to do work that would be much more easily performed with enhanced strength.”). 
03.LAMKIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  3:21 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
524 
people already feel pressure to use biological interventions just to 
remain competitive. Professional athletes appear reluctant to “play 
naked”—i.e., without performance enhancing drugs—out of fear 
that it will put them and/or their teams at a disadvantage against 
players who are doping.108 When the U.S. Senate considered 
imposing a tax on cosmetic procedures, the National Organization 
for Women argued this would be unfair to middle-aged women who 
need Botox and “eye work” to be competitive in the job market.109 
And the trend of using stimulants as study aids has spread from 
college campuses to high schools, where students report that “some 
students who would rather not take the drugs would be compelled 
to [do so] because of the competition over class rank and colleges’ 
interest.”110 One student who admitted to selling Adderall to his 
fellow high school students indicated that “insecurity was a main 
part of his sales pitch,” persuading students that if they did not use 
the drug they “would feel at a huge disadvantage.”111 
2. Agency 
Other concerns deal with how identity-modifying practices can 
change how we perceive ourselves and construct meaning in our 
lives—worries sometimes characterized as involving “agency” and 
“authenticity.” Agency concerns come in several flavors, but their 
common thread is the idea that using biological interventions to 
change how we feel, think, and behave will reinforce the idea that 
our identities are biologically determined.112 
In Listening to Prozac, Peter Kramer tells the story of Sam, an 
architect who sought Kramer’s treatment for depression. Sam had 
“cultivated a continental, nonconformist manner” and prided himself 
 
 108.  Childs Walker, Baseball’s Fast-lane Drug, BALT. SUN, June 25, 2006, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2006-06-25/sports/0606250153_1_amphetamines-traber-
illegal-substance/ (quoting former Major League Baseball player Ken Caminiti, “[Y]ou hear it 
all the time from teammates, ‘You’re not going to play naked, are you?’”); Lance Armstrong 
Used PEDs to Win and “Ruthlessly” Required Teammates to Do Same, USADA says, CBS NEWS 
(Oct. 10, 2012), www.cbsnews.com/news/lance-armstrong-used-peds-to-win-and-ruthlessly-
required-teammates-to-do-same-usada-says/. 
 109.  Jesse McKinley, A Tax on Nips and Tucks Angers Patients, Surgeons, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 29, 2009, at A14. 
 110.  Schwarz, supra note 91. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  KRAMER, supra note 59, at 18. 
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on his independent style.113 While taking Prozac “Sam became less 
bristling, had fewer rough edges,” and he experienced that change as 
a loss. “The style he had nurtured and defended for years now 
seemed not a part of him but an illness. What he had touted as his 
independence of spirit was a biological tic. . . . [T]he medication 
redefined what was essential and what was contingent about his own 
personality.”114 As Kramer repeatedly observed this effect of Prozac 
on some patients’ self-concept, he came to believe that new drugs 
would foster a cultural consensus that our identities are simply 
products of physiological processes: “When one pill at breakfast 
makes you a new person, or makes your patient, or relative, or 
neighbor a new person, it is difficult to resist the suggestion, the 
visceral certainty, that who people are is largely 
biologically determined.”115 
Some worry this materialist consensus will undermine “our 
notions of responsibility, of free will, of unique and socially 
determinative individual development.”116 President Bush’s Council 
on Bioethics argued that using biological interventions to shape who 
we are and how we behave can alter “the relationship between the 
doer and the deed, or between the human agent and the human 
activities he or she engages in.”117 As a result we may cease to view 
ourselves as moral agents who are “responsible—worthy of praise or 
blame—for the things we do and for the way we are.”118 For 
example, when athletes like Lance Armstrong and Alex Rodriguez 
are labeled “frauds” and “cheaters,” the condemnation seems to 
have less to do with their rule-breaking than with the idea that they 
falsely claimed for themselves credit that in fact belonged to their 
drugs.119 As Michael Sandel argued, “[A]s the role of the 
enhancement increases, our admiration for the achievement fades. 
 
 113.  Id. at ix. 
 114.  Id. at x. 
 115.  Id. at 18. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 143. 
 118.  SANDEL, supra note 89, at 25. 
 119.  Thom Loverro, Alex Rodriguez and Lance Armstrong Are Not Heroes – They Are 
Cheaters, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2013), 
www.theguardian.com/sport/2013/aug/13/alex-rodriguez-lance-armstrong-cheaters. 
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Or rather, our admiration for the achievement shifts from the player 
to his pharmacist.”120 
Modifying ourselves with biological interventions may reduce 
our sense of responsibility not only for our achievements, but for our 
shortcomings as well, replacing ideas like character with notions of 
biological inputs and outputs.121 The President’s Council on 
Bioethics illustrated this point by contrasting dealing with “restless 
and unruly” children through moral instruction or biological 
intervention.122 The Council argued that “[p]raise and blame from 
parents and teachers, patient instruction and extra attention, as well 
as the experience of performing poorly or well, can help strengthen 
the will of the child, which slowly increases the child’s ability to 
control his or her impulses and behavior.”123 By contrast, addressing 
problematic behavior using behavior-modifying drugs 
“circumvent[s] that process, and act[s] directly on the brain to affect 
the child’s behavior without the intervening learning process.”124 
Rather than learning self-control, these children may instead come to 
the conclusion that they are “governed largely by chemical impulses 
and not by moral decisions grounded in some sense of what is right 
and appropriate.”125 
3. Authenticity 
Other critics of enhancement worry that by modifying ourselves, 
we are not being true to who we really are. As with the agency 
critique, this concern is not merely about individuals who may be 
living “inauthentic” lives, but about the effects of these practices on 
the broader society. Many people appear to use these technologies to 
relieve discomfort that arises from a broad range of social difficulties. 
 
 120.  SANDEL, supra note 89, at 25; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at 8 (arguing that 
nontherapeutic technologies “blur the line between what we achieve on our own and what we 
achieve because of the levels of various chemicals in our brains.”); BEYOND THERAPY, supra 
note 88, at 144. 
 121.  BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 92 (“regarding ourselves and our activities in 
largely genetic or neurochemical terms may diminish our sense of ourselves as moral actors 
faced with genuine choices and options in life.”). 
 122.  Id. at 91. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 92. 
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To the extent individuals respond to social challenges by modifying 
themselves, this can reduce the impetus to address the 
underlying problems. 
 a. Acceding to social injustices. Society’s appearance standards are 
often infused with forms of prejudice, including a strong preference 
for lighter skin. An individual’s skin tone can have serious financial 
implications. Lighter skin tone is associated with higher educational 
attainment for black men and women, and “strikingly” higher 
employment rates for black women.126 Immigrants to the United 
States with the darkest skin color earn an average of seventeen 
percent less than immigrants with the lightest skin color, even after 
controlling for their occupations in their source countries, education 
levels, English language proficiency, and other factors.127 Racist 
appearance standards can also take an emotional toll. Recent research 
by Margaret Beale Spencer found that when children were presented 
with white and black dolls and asked questions about them, both 
black and white children were more likely to attribute positive 
attributes to the white doll and negative attributes to the darker 
colored doll.128 
While we can credit much of America’s progress on racial issues 
to individuals who have resisted bigotry, others have adapted to 
racial prejudice by obscuring their racial heritage—including a long 
history of using skin-lightening cosmetics among African 
Americans.129 In the United States, skin-lightening is highly 
controversial. Singer Michael Jackson’s ever-lighter skin prompted 
endless speculation that he used skin-lightening interventions—
rumors Jackson felt compelled to deny.130 In 2009, baseball star 
Sammy Sosa caused a stir when he appeared in public with starkly 
 
 126.  Joni Hersch, Skin-Tone Effects among African Americans: Perceptions and Reality, 
96 AM. ECON. REV. 251, 254 (2006). 
 127.  Joni Hersch, Profiling the New Immigrant Worker: The Effects of Skin Color and 
Height, 26 J. LAB. ECON. 345, 346 (2008). 
 128.  Jill Billante & Chuck Hadad, Study: White and Black Children Biased Toward 
Lighter Skin, CNN.COM (May 14, 2010, 4:24 PM), 
www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/13/doll.study/. Spencer’s study recreated the landmark “Doll 
Study” conducted in the 1940s by Kenneth and Mamie Clark. Id. 
 129.  ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 190–93. 
 130.  Madison Park, In Life of Mysteries, Jackson’s Changed Color Baffled Public, 
CNN.COM (July 8, 2009), www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/07/06/skin.color.vitiligo/. 
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lighter skin. Sosa, too, denied he had intentionally lightened his skin, 
but later admitted using a cream to achieve this result.131 
By contrast, in India, skin-lightening is a multimillion dollar 
industry, fueled by advertising that brazenly touts the social 
disadvantages of having dark skin.132 In one ad, a man says to his 
“fairer-skinned” friend, “I am unlucky because of my face.” The 
friend replies, “Not because of your face, because of the color of 
your face.” After using a product called “Fair & Handsome,” the 
darker-skinned actor is miraculously whitened, and he rides off on a 
motorcycle with an attractive woman.133 Other marketing directed at 
women touts skin lightening as a form of feminist empowerment, 
arguing lighter skin will help these women secure better jobs and 
become independent.134 
Judging from the booming market for skin-lighteners, many 
Indians perceive lighter skin to be beneficial. But when individuals 
accede to their society’s preference for lighter skin rather than 
resisting it, they may improve their own prospects at the expense of 
reinforcing racist standards.135 Philosopher Margaret Little refers to 
these practices as forms of “cultural complicity.”136 The more skin-
lighteners, nose surgeries, and double-eyelid procedures are 
performed, the more entrenched these preferences become.137 
 
 131.  Rojas, supra note 91. 
 132.  Shantanu Guha Ray, India’s Unbearable Lightness of Being, BBC NEWS (Mar. 23, 
2010),  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8546183.stm (research agency AC Nielsen estimates 
that in 2010 the Indian whitening cream market was worth $432 million and growing at a rate 
of 25 percent per year). 
 133.  Cosmopolitan Films, Fair Menz, YOUTUBE (Mar. 23, 2008), 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOeRVxWgW1g; Sara Sidner, Skin Whitener Advertisements 
Labeled Racist, CNN.COM (Sept. 9, 2009), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/09/09/india.skin/. 
 134.  Fair & Lovely, Changing Her Destiny, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20121016014701/http://fairandlovely.in/our_history/our_h
istory_details.aspx?histid=historyDetails04 (“When [the Indian woman’s] dreams seem 
impossible to achieve or she felt dejected, Fair & Lovely stepped in and gave her the 
confidence to achieve her dreams.”); Fujifilm84, Fair and Lovely Skin Cream Ad (in English), 
YOUTUBE (Apr. 9, 2007), www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIUQ5hbRHXk (“The obstacle to 
having my dream job was my skin.”). 
 135.  ELLIOTT, supra note 1, 189–90. 
 136.  Id. at 190. 
 137.  Id. 
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The potential for complicity is not limited to cosmetic 
interventions. For example, the typical elementary school 
experience—including expectations to sit quietly and stay focused for 
extended periods of time—is ill-suited to many children, especially 
young boys. Giving cognition-enhancing drugs to children who 
struggle in conventional classrooms may reduce the drive to improve 
the learning environment for these students. One pediatrician who 
admits to prescribing stimulants to children who struggle in school, 
regardless of whether they suffer from ADHD, argues “I don’t have 
a whole lot of choice. . . . We’ve decided as a society that it’s too 
expensive to modify the kid’s environment. So we have to modify 
the kid.”138 Medicating children to get them to sit in their seats for 
longer stretches, or to focus in an overcrowded classroom, may make 
even longer stretches or more crowded classrooms seem viable. 
Children who might have been able to function well in the previous 
environment may need medications to help them cope with the new 
one, creating a spiral of increasing pressure to medicate. 
b. Distorting emotional responses. Concerns about responding to 
social problems by manipulating one’s personality and emotions are 
not new. In 1957, a Time Magazine story headlined Happiness By 
Prescription expressed alarm over the widespread use of tranquilizers 
to “treat” the common stresses and disappointments of everyday 
life.139 In terms that now seem quaint, one pharmacologist wondered 
whether these practices might “make millions of people significantly 
indifferent to politics—or to their responsibilities as automobile 
drivers?”140 By 1971, Richard Nixon was grousing that “[w]e have 
produced an environment in which people come naturally to expect 
that they can take a pill for every problem—that they can find 
satisfaction and health and happiness in a handful of tablets or a few 
grains of powder.”141 
 
 138.  Alan Schwarz, Attention Disorder or Not, Pills to Help in School, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2012, at A1. 
 139.  Happiness by Prescription, TIME, Mar. 11, 1957, at 61. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Richard Nixon, Remarks to the American Medical Association’s House of Delegates 
Meeting in Atlantic City, New Jersey (June 22, 1971), 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3051. 
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These early rumblings took on new urgency in the 1990s with 
the blockbuster success of a new class of antidepressants called 
SSRIs. Unlike the minor tranquilizers that preceded them, drugs like 
Prozac did not merely relieve anxiety, but in some cases profoundly 
altered personalities.142 These drugs seemed to help many people 
whose discomfort often seemed less like manifestations of illness than 
understandable frustrations and anxieties in the face of challenging, 
though not necessarily unusual, circumstances.143 
While some people may feel happier while taking antidepressants, 
some observers worry that using medications to tweak emotions may 
leave us “estrange[d] . . . emotionally from life as it really is,” 
preventing ourselves from “responding to events and experiences, 
whether good or bad, in a fitting way.”144 Part of the concern about 
creating a disconnect between people’s emotions and the world 
around them relates to how this might affect individuals in their 
pursuit of the good life.145 If we are trapped in unrewarding jobs or 
harmful relationships, the emotional distress caused by these 
circumstances can motivate us to change, to seek something better 
or more meaningful. If we instead use medication to blunt our 
emotional distress, we may be less likely to pursue these changes. 
Describing her experiences on antidepressants, author Katherine 
Sharpe writes: 
Looking back, it seems remarkable that I had to work so hard to 
absorb an elementary lesson: Some things make me feel happy, 
other things make me feel sad. But for a long time antidepressants 
were giving me the opposite lesson. If I was suffering because of a 
glitch in my brain, it didn’t make much difference what I did. For 
me, antidepressants had promoted a kind of emotional illiteracy. 
They had prevented me from noticing the reasons that I felt bad 
when I did and from appreciating the effects of my own choices.146 
 
 142.  See KRAMER, supra note 59, at 18–19. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 255. 
 145.  As Carl Elliott asks, “Who is better off: the contented slave, or the angry one? The 
man who sins happily, or the one who feels guilt and shame?” Carl Elliott, Medicate Your 
Dissent, SPEAKEASY MAG. (2003), reprinted at www.tc.umn.edu/~ellio023/medicate.htm. 
 146.  Katherine Sharpe, The Medication Generation, WALL STREET J., June 29, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303649504577493112618709108.html. 
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Beyond the potential to cause problems for individuals, some 
worry about the cumulative effect of these practices on society. For 
example, Kramer observed that Prozac caused his patient, Tess, to 
become less serious.147 One of the “symptoms” Prozac seemed to 
relieve for Tess was her “heightened awareness of the needs of 
others.”148 She was a happier individual as a result, but diminished 
concern for others becomes troubling when multiplied across the 
eleven percent of Americans age twelve or older who 
take antidepressants.149 
Emerging technologies may provide new opportunities to sever 
emotional responses from external circumstances. For example, the 
potential to dampen, or even erase, memories could provide great 
relief to people who have experienced trauma, or even merely sad or 
embarrassing episodes. But painful memories also serve important 
purposes—to individuals as well as to society at large. In response to 
a New York Times story about memory-erasure research, one 
reader opined: 
Six years ago, I watched both of my teenage boys die, several hours 
apart, after our car was struck by a speeding patrol car. . . . I don’t 
mean to judge the way in which others should treat (or be treated 
for) their own personal tragedies. But for me, I needed to retain 
every detail of my memory, not only for the manslaughter trial that 
followed a year and a half later but also for my own well-being. I 
now share my experience, in vivid detail, with police officers and 
recruits, hoping to prevent this from happening to others. 
Although it’s painful to relive that night and its aftermath, doing so 
helps me feel that I am doing something positive with 
this tragedy.150 
If we medicate away shame and remorse for bad decisions or 
behavior, we may fail to learn important lessons and repeat mistakes 
or bad acts we might have avoided.151 While few would begrudge 
 
 147.  KRAMER, supra note 59, at 9. 
 148.  Id. at 10. 
 149.  Pratt, supra note 56, at 5. 
 150.  Michelle Norton Spicer, Letter: The Quest to Forget, N.Y. TIMES MAG., April 18, 
2004, at 6. 
 151.  BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 232 (“the power to numb or eliminate the 
psychic sting of certain memories risks eroding the responsibility we take for our own actions—
 
03.LAMKIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  3:21 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
532 
soldiers an intervention that might relieve them of some of the 
mental traumas of war, their memories of those horrors serve 
important purposes, as do the memories of Holocaust survivors and 
witnesses of other atrocities.152 As the President’s Council on 
Bioethics asked, “Would the community as a whole—would the 
human race—be served by such a mass numbing of this terrible but 
indispensable memory? Do those who suffer evil have a duty to 
remember and bear witness, lest we all forget the very horrors that 
haunt them?”153 
II. REGULATING IDENTITY-MODIFYING INTERVENTIONS 
The United States’ existing legal structures governing medical 
interventions are designed to regulate treatments for illnesses.154 
Within that context, the prime consideration is ensuring that these 
treatments are safe to use—i.e., that they promote human health. In 
philosopher Norman Daniels’ terms, we can (nearly) all agree on the 
value of treating illnesses irrespective of our comprehensive moral 
doctrines.155 So when presented with an intervention that treats 
cancer, we generally do not feel compelled to ask whether shrinking 
tumors should be permitted. Rather, the aim of regulation is to 
ensure that the treatment is safe and effective. 
By contrast, using biological interventions to modify healthy 
brains and bodies is often highly controversial.156 Although many 
people highly desire these interventions, others condemn them as 
immoral or socially detrimental and wish to restrict them. Catholics 
 
since we would never have to face the harsh judgment of our own conscience . . . or the 
memory of others.”). 
 152.  Id. at 230–31. 
 153.  Id. at 231. 
 154.  For example, the Controlled Substances Act “allows prescription of drugs only if 
they have a ‘currently accepted medical use,’ 21 U.S.C. § 812(b); requires a ‘medical purpose’ 
for dispensing the least controlled substances of those on the schedules, § 829(c); and, in its 
reporting provision, defines a ‘valid prescription’ as one ‘issued for a legitimate medical 
purpose,’ § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii).” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006). 
 155.  DANIELS, supra note 103, at 155. But see Paul Vitello, Christian Science Church 
Seeks Truce With Modern Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A20 (noting that, 
historically, Christian Scientists have rejected using medical treatment to promote health). 
 156.  DANIELS, supra note 103, at 154. 
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believe contraception interferes with God’s will.157 In the 1800s, 
Teetotalers argued drinking alcohol leads to “idleness, disorder, 
[and] pauperism.”158 While students diagnosed with ADHD are 
often encouraged to take Adderall to help them study, healthy 
students who use the drug for the same purpose risk academic and 
criminal sanctions.159 But because our existing regulatory systems 
were not designed with nontherapeutic practices in mind, these 
systems are largely blind to these disputes. Accordingly, as we 
develop new medical technologies and practices that seem designed 
to change identities rather than treat illnesses, calls are growing to 
expand regulatory systems to address concerns other than 
protecting health.160 
Section A of this part briefly outlines various forms of medical 
regulation in the United States and describes how most of these 
efforts are at least ostensibly directed at protecting the health of 
users of medical interventions. It also notes that legislation 
restricting reproduction technologies represents a key exception to 
this general emphasis. Section B describes calls to expand regulatory 
authority to regulate nontherapeutic medical interventions on the 
basis of broader moral concerns. 
A. Existing Medical Regulation Is Largely Blind to Moral Concerns 
Beyond Protecting Health 
Medical practices are regulated in the United States through a 
patchwork of overlapping federal and state laws and regulations, 
courts, and professional associations. Although these regulatory 
activities take a variety of forms, they generally share—at least on the 
surface—a common animating purpose: protecting the health of 
people who undergo biological interventions. 
 
 157.  See, e.g., Catholic Answers, Birth Control, 
www.catholic.com/library/Birth_Control.asp (“Contraception is wrong because it’s a 
deliberate violation of the design God built into the human race, often referred to as 
‘natural law.’”). 
 158.  Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887). 
 159.  See, e.g., Allie Grasgreen, Are Prescription Drugs ‘Cheating’?, INSIDE HIGHER ED. 
(Oct. 13, 2010), www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/10/13/wesleyan#ixzz38nPELRJ4 
(indicating Wesleyan University’s Code of Non-Academic Conduct deems the “misuse or 
abuse” of prescription drugs a violation of the school’s student honor code). 
 160.  See infra note 208. 
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1. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which 
regulates the sale of drugs and medical devices, is designed to ensure 
that drugs and medical devices are safe to use.161 One of the key ways 
it does this is by requiring manufacturers to obtain approval from the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before marketing their 
products.162 When a pharmaceutical company wants to sell a new 
drug, it must submit a New Drug Application and provide evidence 
that the drug is safe and “will have the effect it purports or is 
represented to have.”163 The manufacturer also must provide the 
FDA with the company’s proposed labeling for the drug, “which 
includes, inter alia, all proposed claims about the drug’s risks and 
benefits, as well as adequate directions for use.”164 If the FDA 
determines that the drug is sufficiently safe and is effective for the 
purposes described in the drug’s label, the agency issues an order 
approving the application, allowing the manufacturer to market the 
drug in a manner consistent with its label.165 The FDCA also protects 
patient health by, among other things, regulating how drugs and 
medical devices are manufactured, barring the sale of misbranded or 
adulterated drugs, and monitoring reports of adverse events 
experienced by users of these products.166 
Because the focus of the FDCA is to protect patient health, 
neither the Act nor the FDA seeks to limit the use of medical 
interventions to therapeutic purposes. For example, the agency 
approved Botox for the “treatment” of “severe frown lines”—a 
condition that could hardly be considered a disease, and which poses 
no apparent threat to human health.167 The FDA also does not seek 
 
 161.  Wallace F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, FDA (June 1981) 
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm056044.htm. 
 162.  21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012); see also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to 
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 163.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b). 
 164. Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1998) 
(citing part of 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)). 
 165.  21 U.S.C § 355(d). 
 166.  Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 725. 
 167.  FDA, FDA Approves Botox Cosmetic to Improve the Appearance of Crow’s Feet Lines 
(Sept. 11, 2013), 
www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm367662.htm. 
03.LAMKIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  3:21 PM 
501 Regulating Identity  
 535 
to prevent doctors from prescribing medications for nontherapeutic 
uses. Once the FDA approves a drug to treat a particular indication, 
doctors generally may prescribe it for other purposes as they see fit.168 
So while the FDA approved the drug Adderall as a treatment for 
ADHD, the FDCA does not prevent doctors from prescribing it to 
healthy students who want to enhance their concentration when 
doing homework.169 On the contrary, so-called “off-label” 
prescribing is very common, particularly for 
psychotropic medications.170 
Nor does the FDA believe its mandate encompasses addressing 
concerns like fairness, coercion, or authenticity. The Agency has 
categorically denied that “moral, religious, or ethical issues” fall 
within its purview.171 The FDA has made this abundantly clear on 
multiple occasions, most notably in connection with its approval of 
human growth hormone (HGH) as a treatment for children who are 
very short, but do not suffer from a known health deficit.172 In 
approving Eli Lilly & Company’s application to promote HGH to 
help these short (but healthy) children grow taller, the FDA advisory 
committee evaluating the drug expressly rejected the idea that it 
should consider issues beyond its safety and efficacy: 
[A]ny decision that’s made with regard to growth hormone in this 
instance will be based upon a judgment of a favorable balance of 
risk versus benefit for the proposed indication, and that would not, 
in our minds, be setting a broad policy with regard, generally, to 
the use of drugs for cosmetic purposes. I’d also propose that it is 
not the purpose of this meeting to debate the merits of approvals of 
other drugs for what some—usually those unaffected by the target 
 
 168.  U.S v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Once FDA-approved, 
prescription drugs can be prescribed by doctors for both FDA-approved and -unapproved uses; 
the FDA generally does not regulate how physicians use approved drugs.”). 
 169.  Lawrence Diller, The Homework Pill, HUFFINGTON POST, June 5, 2012, 
www.huffingtonpost.com/larry-diller/adderallhomework_b_1549595.html. 
 170.  David C. Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023–24 (2006) (finding that 73 percent of off-label 
prescriptions by office-based doctors—and 94 percent of prescriptions for psychiatric 
therapies—had little or no scientific support). 
 171.  U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA’s Response to Public Comment on the 
Animal Cloning Risk Assessment, Risk Management Plan, and Guidance for Industry (July 23, 
2014), www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AnimalCloning/ucm055491.htm. 
 172.  Fox, supra note 97, at 1139–40. 
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condition—might construe as cosmetic purposes. And I think it’s 
safe to say that we should concede that once demonstrated to be 
safe and effective, the choice of whether to attempt therapy for, for 
example, baldness, or mild acne, or even overweight is up to 
doctors, patients and their families as they weigh the potential 
benefits of the therapy against the potential risks.173 
2. The Controlled Substances Act 
The federal government also regulates drugs through the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). As discussed below, in practice the 
CSA often seems to serve as a way of expressing moral 
condemnation of certain uses of drugs. But on its face the Act’s 
primary objective is to combat drug abuse and addiction, which it 
seeks to accomplish through “a comprehensive, closed regulatory 
regime criminalizing the unauthorized manufacture, distribution, 
dispensing, and possession” of numerous drugs, or “controlled 
substances.”174 Nothing in the Act purports, or appears designed, to 
further other interests like ensuring fairness or 
protecting authenticity. 
Like the FDCA, the CSA is designed to regulate drugs based on 
their health risks and benefits. The Act assigns controlled substances 
to one of five schedules, ostensibly based on the drugs’ “potential for 
abuse or dependence, their accepted medical use, and their accepted 
safety for use under medical supervision.”175 Schedule I includes 
drugs that are considered to have “a high potential for abuse,” that 
are deemed to have “no currently accepted medical use,” and that 
allegedly cannot be used safely, even under medical supervision.176 
Substances in Schedule II are considered to have accepted medical 
uses, but also to pose safety risks and/or heightened potential for 
 
 173.  FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND 
RESEARCH, ENDOCRINOLOGIC AND METABOLIC DRUGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING 
(Food and Drug Administration Department of Health and Human Services ed., June 
10, 2003). 
 174.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 250; 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 
844 (2012). 
 175.  Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 250; 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
 176.  21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). 
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abuse.177 Drugs in Schedule I are banned; with very limited 
exceptions for drug research and religious practices, their possession 
is a crime.178 Drugs in Schedules II through IV may be obtained 
lawfully only by prescription.179 
Unlike the FDCA, the CSA gives federal officials some authority 
to regulate the practice of medicine.180 To lawfully prescribe 
scheduled drugs, doctors must register with the Attorney General.181 
The Attorney General may revoke a physician’s registration upon 
finding (among other things) that the practitioner “has committed 
such acts as would render his registration . . . inconsistent with the 
public interest.”182 Drug Enforcement Agency regulations provide 
that in order to be “effective”—i.e., to comport with the CSA—“[a] 
prescription for a controlled substance . . . must be issued for a 
legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the 
usual course of his professional practice.”183 If a doctor writes a 
prescription for a controlled substance that is not for a “legitimate 
medical purpose,” the prescription is invalid and the doctor can be 
subject to the CSA’s criminal penalties.184 
On their face, these broadly-worded provisions appear to give 
the Attorney General the power to rely on considerations other than 
safety to determine that prescribing drugs for nontherapeutic 
purposes is not legitimate.185 However, the Supreme Court has 
determined that the CSA grants the Attorney General only very 
 
 177.  Douglas J. Behr, Prescription Drug Control Under the Federal Controlled Substances 
Act: A Web of Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Law Controls, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 41, 51–52 (1994). 
 178.  Scott Gast, Who Defines “Legitimate Medical Practice?” Lessons Learned from the 
Controlled Substances Act, Physician-Assisted Suicide, & Oregon v. Ashcroft, 10 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 261, 266 (2002). 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012). 
 181.  Id. § 822(a)(2). 
 182.  Id. § 824(a)(4). 
 183.  21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2015). 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  At least one scholar has interpreted the CSA in this way. See Katherine Drabiak-
Syed, Reining In the Pharmacological Enhancement Train: We Should Remain Vigilant about 
Regulatory Standards for Prescribing Controlled Substances, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 272, 275–
76 (2011) (arguing that prescribing a Schedule IV drug to stimulate a patient’s focus or 
concentration constitutes an enhancement purpose that may violate the CSA regulation’s 
“legitimate medical purpose” requirement). 
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narrow authority to regulate the practice of medicine—specifically, to 
prevent doctors from acting as drug dealers.186 In Gonzales v. Oregon, 
the Supreme Court addressed an action by the U.S. Attorney 
General declaring that assisting suicide, as Oregon state law 
permitted, was outside the scope of legitimate medical practice and 
therefore violated the Controlled Substances Act.187 In invalidating 
the Attorney General’s action, the Court rejected the federal 
government’s contention that the words “medicine” and “medical” 
“ineluctably refer[] to a healing or curative art,” such that drugs 
prescribed for nontherapeutic purposes were necessarily outside the 
scope of legitimate medical practice.188 The Court concluded that the 
purpose of the CSA’s prescription requirement was not to limit 
medical practice to therapeutic purposes, but to protect patients’ 
health by “ensur[ing] patients use controlled substances under the 
supervision of a doctor so as to prevent addiction and 
recreational abuse.”189 
3. State regulation 
States also regulate the prescribing of drugs, as well as other 
medical practices, through state statutes, medical licensing bodies, 
and tort law.190 As at the federal level, however, state medical 
regulation is generally aimed at protecting patient safety, rather than 
restricting interventions on moral grounds. 
 
 186.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269–70 (2006) (“The [CSA] and our case law 
amply support the conclusion that Congress regulates medical practice insofar as it bars doctors 
from using their prescription-writing powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and 
trafficking as conventionally understood. Beyond this, however, the statute manifests no intent 
to regulate the practice of medicine generally.”). 
 187.  66 Fed. Reg. 56, 607–56, 608 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
 188.  Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 272. 
 189.  Id. at 274. At oral argument, several Justices questioned whether the CSA permits 
states to include nontherapeutic practices—like giving steroids to bodybuilders, or prescribing 
drugs simply to make people happier—within the scope of legitimate medical practice. Oral 
Argument in Gonzales v. Oregon, 21 ISSUES L. & MED. 213, 226 (Roberts, J.), 226 
(Ginsburg, J.), 227 (O’Connor, J.), 233 (Scalia, J.). 
 190.  Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 427, 446–53 (2015). 
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Although the FDCA preempts most state efforts to regulate the 
sale of FDA-approved drugs and devices,191 states regulate controlled 
substances in ways that mirror the federal CSA.192 All states impose 
criminal penalties for possessing or distributing Schedule I drugs or 
possessing, distributing, or prescribing other controlled substances 
without a valid prescription.193 While states may impose additional 
restrictions on how doctors prescribe scheduled drugs, state drug 
laws are generally consonant with the CSA.194 
Unlike the federal government, states play a significant role in 
regulating medical practice. States require physicians to be licensed 
by state medical boards before practicing medicine, and these boards 
can revoke physicians’ licenses if their practices are deemed unethical 
or outside the bounds of accepted practice.195 States also regulate the 
practice of medicine through malpractice suits, which enable patients 
harmed by medical interventions to obtain damages from physicians 
who breach the standard of care.196 
However, neither licensing boards nor tort law seeks to constrain 
doctors from providing nontherapeutic interventions, or to regulate 
these interventions on moral grounds beyond protecting patient 
safety. Rather, these forms of regulation allow the medical profession 
to define for itself the scope of legitimate practice. For example, a 
plastic surgery patient could not recover in a malpractice action on 
the grounds that the procedure the doctor performed was not 
 
 191.  Tamsen Valoir & Shubha Ghosh, FDA Preemption of Drug and Device Labeling: 
Who Should Decide What Goes on a Drug Label?, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 555 (2011). 
 192.  Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 251 (“[t]he CSA explicitly contemplates a role for the States 
in regulating controlled substances.”); 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
 193.  See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3306 (“Schedules of controlled substances”); 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3304 (“Prohibited Acts”). 
 194.  Recent state marijuana laws that contradict federal prohibitions are a notable 
exception. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (legalizing marijuana possession); 29 
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.401(3) (2013) (also legalizing marijuana possession); Robert A. 
Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to 
Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421 (2009). 
 195.  See, e.g., Katherine Drabiak-Syed, supra note 185, at 276 (citing TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 63-6-214 (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 37: 1275, 1261 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4731.22 (2015)). 
 196.  States also play a limited role in regulating FDA-approved drugs and devices 
through tort litigation. While most state law tort suits based on harms caused by drugs and 
devices are preempted by the FDCA, a few actions remain viable. See Valoir & Ghosh supra 
note 191. 
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therapeutic. Instead, tort liability typically hinges on whether the 
doctor performed the procedure as other reasonably prudent plastic 
surgeons would.197 Similarly, state medical boards can suspend or 
revoke physicians’ licenses for things like gross negligence, repeated 
negligent acts, or incompetence—again, defined by reference to how 
reasonably prudent doctors conduct themselves.198 But as long as the 
patient consented to the intervention and the doctor performed it 
competently, it matters very little whether the doctor provided the 
intervention for a therapeutic purpose. 
On their face, some state laws suggest otherwise. For example, 
California’s Health and Safety Code provides that a physician may 
prescribe controlled substances “only when in good faith he or she 
believes the disease, ailment, injury, or infirmity requires the 
treatment.”199 Taken literally, this provision appears to bar physicians 
from prescribing controlled substances for nontherapeutic purposes. 
Presumably that would be unwelcome news to the state’s many 
doctors who prescribe Botox to individuals who want fewer 
wrinkles.200 In practice, however, these state laws operate in a manner 
similar to the CSA’s requirement that doctors only issue 
prescriptions for “legitimate medical purpose[s]”—i.e., to prosecute 
doctors who act as “dealers” of narcotics and other addictive 
prescription drugs. To make out a case under these laws, prosecutors 
must show indicia of drug dealing—such as charging patients by the 
volume of narcotics prescribed, or prescribing narcotics without first 
examining patients.201 A review of state court opinions identified no 
cases in which doctors were prosecuted for prescribing drugs for 
nontherapeutic purposes where these other indicia of drug dealing 
were not also present. 
 
 197.  Anne Bloom, Plastic Injuries, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 759, 784 (2014) (“[I]n plastic 
surgery litigation, what matters is whether the plastic surgeon’s practices deviated significantly 
from the practices of other plastic surgeons in the same field.”). 
 198.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2234 (2015). 
 199.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11210 (2015); see also Rules of the Tennessee 
State Board of Medical Examiners, Ch. 0880-02-.14(6)(a)(3) (defining “[n]on-therapeutic in 
nature or manner” as “[a] medical use or purpose that is not legitimate.”). 
 200.  Medical Board of California, Frequently Asked Questions - Cosmetic Treatments, 
www.mbc.ca.gov/Licensees/Cosmetic_Treatments_FAQ.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2015). 
 201.  21 C.F.R. 1306 (2006); United States v. Rosen, 582 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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4. A notable exception: reproduction technology 
While most medical regulation emphasizes protecting human 
health, in the case of reproduction technologies governments have 
repeatedly sought to restrict nontherapeutic interventions to enforce 
a particular conception of morality. Sometimes these restrictions are 
framed as safety measures but in fact seem intended to bar the use of 
these technologies, irrespective of whether they threaten women’s 
health. For example, in 2011 the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation 
and Research (CDER) determined that a contraceptive intervention 
known as Plan B was effective and could be used safely by girls of all 
ages, such that it should be available “over the counter” at any age 
rather than requiring a prescription.202 In an unprecedented action, 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services overruled the FDA’s 
determination. Secretary Sebelius framed her action in terms of 
protecting health, claiming there was insufficient data to establish 
that younger girls could use the drug safely. But many people believe 
the Secretary’s interference was not based on safety considerations, 
but rather was “a politically motivated effort to avoid riling religious 
groups and others opposed to making birth control available to 
girls.”203 Indeed, a federal district court thoroughly repudiated the 
Secretary’s action as “politically motivated [and] 
scientifically unjustified.”204 
Other legislative actions regulating abortion procedures are 
expressly based on moral condemnation of these practices. The 
federal government and the overwhelming majority of states prohibit 
doctors from performing certain abortion procedures, generally after 
a designated period of fetal gestation.205 Under the federal Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, any physician who knowingly 
performs an intact dilation and extraction—a procedure used to 
terminate some late-term pregnancies—faces up to two years in 
 
 202.  Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 166–67 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 203.  Gardiner Harris, White House and the FDA Often at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
2012 at A1. 
 204.  Tummino, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 192. 
 205.  See, e.g., The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–105, 
117 Stat. 1201, (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003)) (prohibiting a later-term 
abortion procedure); GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES ON LATER-TERM 
ABORTIONS (Nov. 1, 2015), www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf 
(summarizing state restrictions on late-term abortion procedures). 
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prison and/or a criminal fine.206 The prohibition is expressly 
motivated by moral condemnation of a procedure that Congress has 
deemed nontherapeutic. The Act includes a Congressional finding 
that “[a] moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the 
practice of performing a partial-birth abortion . . . is a gruesome and 
inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and should 
be prohibited.”207 
In the present context these efforts to restrict reproduction 
technologies are noteworthy because they provide concrete examples 
of regulating nontherapeutic medical interventions on moral 
grounds other than protecting safety. In contrast to the FDA’s 
determinations regarding the safety and efficacy of medical 
interventions, these actions are not based on objective assessments of 
scientific data. Rather they are highly politicized, and subject to 
shifting public opinion and the differing priorities of new 
administrations. As discussed below, these actions also intrude upon 
deeply personal decisions that profoundly affect women’s ability to 
control their own bodies and identities. 
B. Proposals to Broaden the Scope of Medical Regulation 
Some worry that existing regulatory systems focus too narrowly 
on protecting health, and have called for expanding the scope of 
federal regulation of medicine to address broader social and ethical 
concerns.208 Francis Fukuyama argues that new medical technologies 
 
 206.  18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012). 
 207.  The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, Section 2(1), 117 Stat. at 1201. 
 208.  See, e.g., Secretary of Health and Human Services’ Advisory Committee on 
Genetics, Health and Society, Public Comments on Preliminary Final Recommendations on 
Oversight of Genetic Testing, 65 Fed. Reg. 21,094, 21,095 (Apr. 19, 2000) (noting that the 
FDA’s review process does not consider “the ethical and social implications” of genetic tests 
and arguing that “[t]he Secretary should consider the development of a mechanism to ensure 
the identification and appropriate review of tests that raise major social and ethical concerns.”); 
FUKUYAMA, supra note 3 at 213 (advocating the creation of “a new agency to oversee the 
approval of new medicines, procedures, and technologies for human health” with the power 
“to make judgments about the technology’s social and ethical implications.”); Fox, supra note 
97 (advocating expanding the FDA’s mandate to consider ethical concerns and to restrict 
access to interventions that could be used for enhancement purposes); Gary Marchant et al., 
Integrating Social and Ethical Concerns Into Regulatory Decision-Making for Emerging 
Technologies, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 345 (2010) (advocating incorporating broader 
ethical concerns into the FDA’s review of drugs and devices); Ellen M. McGee, Should There 
Be A Law? Brain Chips: Ethical and Policy Issues, 24 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 81 (2007) (arguing 
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threaten human dignity and a human nature that he believes is, 
“conjointly with religion, what defines our most basic values.”209 
Fukuyama argues it is imperative to go beyond merely exploring the 
ethical issues raised by emerging medical technologies, and to 
quickly create regulatory institutions that are empowered to limit the 
use of enhancement technologies.210 He urges countries to “regulate 
the development and use of technology politically, setting up 
institutions that will discriminate between those technological 
advances that promote human flourishing, and those that pose a 
threat to human dignity and well-being.”211 
Noting that the FDA has neither the legal authority nor the 
institutional capacity to address concerns beyond safety and efficacy, 
Fukuyama advocates creating “a new agency to oversee the approval 
of new medicines, procedures, and technologies for human 
 
FDA review “is inadequate to consider the social and policy questions raised by . . . 
enhancement devices” and urging the creation of new regulatory systems to address these 
issues); Ellen M. McGee and Gerald Q. Maguire, Jr., Becoming Borg to Become Immortal: 
Regulating Brain Implant Technologies, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 291 (2007) 
(“No system exists for consideration of the extraordinary social and policy questions raised 
by . . . devices when used for enhancement. This level of scrutiny should be added and 
considered the equivalent of an environmental impact statement.”); Leon R. Kass, The New 
Biology: What Price Relieving Man’s Estate?, 174 SCI. 779, 787 (1971) (advocating attempts 
“to detect and diminish the social costs of biomedical advances by intelligent institutional 
regulation” and arguing that “[c]oncepts of ‘risk’ and ‘cost’ need to be broadened to 
include . . . social and ethical consequences.”); Eric Chan, Comment, The Food and Drug 
Administration and the Future of the Brain-Computer Interface: Adapting FDA Device Law to 
the Challenges of Human-Machine Enhancement, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
117 (2007) (noting that the FDA does not address the ethical issues raised by enhancement, 
and advocating expanding the Agency’s authority to regulate enhancements on the basis of 
moral concerns unrelated to safety); Maxwell J. Mehlman, How Will We Regulate Genetic 
Enhancement?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 689 (1999) (“In seeking to regulate genetic 
enhancement, in any event, society must attend not only to the traditional regulatory concerns 
of safety and efficacy, but to the problems of social inequality and cheating posed by the lack of 
universal access to enhancement technologies.”); Whitehouse et. al., supra note 38, at 21 
(“[T]he licensing process of the FDA focuses on clinical safety and efficacy. The agency has 
little experience with evaluating the types of social costs and benefits that regulating cognitive 
enhancers would entail. At the least, we would need to supplement the normal review process 
of the agency so that it considered these issues, and provide the agency with the expertise to 
do so. The former might well require a change in the enabling legislation of the agency.”). 
 209.  FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at 7. 
 210.  Id. at 203–04. 
 211.  Id. at 182. 
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health.”212 This new agency would “adjudicate among competing 
ethical claims” in order to distinguish between “legitimate” and 
“illegitimate” uses of medical technology, and would be empowered 
to restrict or prohibit practices it deemed illegitimate.213 The broader 
scope of this new entity’s mandate would require new staffing, 
including “not just the doctors and scientists who staff the FDA and 
oversee clinical trials for new drugs, but other societal voices that are 
prepared to make judgments about the technology’s social and 
ethical implications.”214 
Other scholars have advocated incorporating this kind of ethical 
machinery within the FDA.215 Gary Marchant and his co-authors 
have argued that although the regulatory approval stage of 
technology development offers “the best opportunity to expressly 
and formally consider the ethical and social impacts of new 
technologies,”216 legal and practical restraints prevent federal 
regulatory agencies from addressing these issues: 
Given that many of the public concerns about such technologies 
are ethical or social in nature, it seems inappropriate from both a 
normative and instrumental perspective for regulatory agencies to 
continue to disregard such concerns because they are outside of 
their stated regulatory missions. . . . [I]n a democracy, citizens 
should have the right to raise moral and social concerns about a 
proposed government action, and to have those concerns 
considered and addressed by government decision-makers.217 
 
 212.  Id. at 213–14 (noting that “[t]he FDA can disapprove a procedure only on the 
grounds of effectiveness and safety,” and the Agency “is not set up to make politically sensitive 
decisions” about the broader ethical implications of enhancements). 
 213.  See, e.g., id. at 213. While Fukuyama is primarily concerned with regulating genetic 
modification of children—interventions that raise issues beyond the scope of this paper—his 
arguments also extend to the regulation of pharmaceutical interventions. Id. at 41–56. 
 214.  Id. at 214. 
 215.  See, e.g., Whitehouse et al., supra note 38, at 21 (“[T]he licensing process of the 
FDA focuses on clinical safety and efficacy. The agency has little experience with evaluating the 
types of social costs and benefits that regulating cognitive enhancers would entail. At the least, 
we would need to supplement the normal review process of the agency so that it considered 
these issues, and provide the agency with the expertise to do so. The former might well require 
a change in the enabling legislation of the agency.”). 
 216.  Marchant, et al., supra note 208, at 349. 
 217.  Id. 
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Marchant suggests the FDA could create an “ethics review board” 
similar to its existing advisory committees that provide scientific 
advice. The board “would provide comparable advice on the ethical 
and social dimensions of the agency’s actions”—including such issues 
as new technologies’ “potential use for enhancing humans, the 
‘unnatural’ nature of some of the interventions made possible by 
new technologies, and the commoditization or destruction of human 
or animal ‘life,’ however defined.”218 
Dov Fox has similarly advocated expanding the FDA’s mandate 
to include addressing ethical concerns about medical products that 
can be used for nontherapeutic purposes. Fox proposes creating a 
new administrative process within the FDA in which drugs and 
devices deemed to have enhancement potential would be 
“earmarked for special analysis and consideration.”219 That analysis 
would include such considerations as “unfairness in competitive 
activities, inequality of access to positional advantages, perpetuation 
of social prejudice, threats to individual agency, identity, and 
authenticity, social conformity and subtle coercion, and negative 
externalities when such technologies are pursued collectively.”220 
When the FDA determined an intervention would threaten adverse 
social consequences or important values, the agency would have 
authority to limit how—or whether—the intervention could be used. 
Common to these proposals is the idea that regulators should 
distinguish therapeutic practices from nontherapeutic, and subject 
the latter to heightened restrictions. While therapies would continue 
to be evaluated based on safety, enhancements could be restricted on 
the basis of other moral objections. 
III. THE HAZARDS OF MEDICAL REGULATION AS SOCIAL 
CONTROL 
As new medical technologies proliferate, offering ever more 
powerful and precise ways to shape identities, calls to regulate on 
moral grounds will likely grow louder.221 Several observers have 
 
 218.  Id. at 347, 360. 
 219.  Fox, supra note 97, at 1194–95. 
 220.  Id. at 1195. 
 221.  See, e.g., Marchant et. al, supra note 208, at 348 (“As the number of available drugs 
addressing cognitive performance (e.g., Alzheimer’s treatments) is expected to expand over the 
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already raised the prospect of urine testing of students and 
employees to prevent cognitive “doping”—an approach endorsed by 
Britain’s Academy of Medical Sciences.222 And although 
interventions to dampen or edit memories have only begun to be 
tested in humans,223 the mere prospect of these technologies has 
spawned considerable concern, as well as discussion of possible 
legal restrictions.224 
But even if one accepts critics’ arguments that enhancement 
technologies can have troubling moral or social implications, it 
would be a mistake to conclude that we should restrict them on that 
basis. Many morally problematic practices are legal. Sometimes we 
allow them because we do not believe legal restrictions would be 
effective in deterring these practices or addressing their potential 
harms. We allow other practices because, although many people find 
them morally objectionable, they are considered personal choices 
that lie within individuals’ rights to self-determination. Before vastly 
expanding government’s authority to interfere with individuals’ 
medical decisions, it would be prudent to examine whether legal 
restrictions would be effective in achieving their aims, and whether 
the aims themselves are proper. As it happens, the United States 
already has substantial experience in regulating nontherapeutic 
medical interventions on moral grounds, and these efforts have been 
both ineffective and unduly intrusive. 
A. Restricting Biological Interventions on Moral Grounds Is Ineffective 
1. Existing drug prohibitions are based largely on moral condemnation 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, members of the 
temperance movement unabashedly touted the moral underpinnings 
 
next decade, the inability of FDA to consider factors other than safety and efficacy will become 
increasingly problematic and limiting.”). 
 222.  HUMAN ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF WORK, supra note 93; Ian Sample, 
Exam Cheating Alert Over Brain Drugs, THE GUARDIAN (May 22, 2008), 
www.guardian.co.uk/science/2008/may/22/drugs.medicalresearch; Rebecca Roache, 
Enhancement and Cheating, 2 EXPOSITIONS 153 (2008); Vince Cakic, Smart Drugs for 
Cognitive Enhancement: Ethical and Pragmatic Considerations in the Era of Cosmetic 
Neurology, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 611 (2009); Whitehouse et al., supra note 38. 
 223.  Kroes et al., supra note 82. 
 224.  BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88 at 214–34; Kolber, supra note 87. 
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of their prohibitionist agenda. In The License Cases, counsel for the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts defended laws restricting alcohol 
sales by arguing: 
The train of evils which mark the progress of intemperance is too 
obvious to require comment. It brings with it degradation of 
character, impairs the moral and physical energies, wastes the 
health, increases the number of paupers and criminals, undermines 
the morals, and sinks its victims to the lowest depths of vice 
and profligacy.225 
The Volstead Act, which implemented alcohol prohibition under 
the Eighteenth Amendment, did not ban alcohol entirely. Rather, it 
expressly allowed alcohol to be prescribed by a physician who “in 
good faith believes that the use of such liquor as a medicine by [a 
patient] is necessary and will afford relief to him from some known 
ailment.”226 It also allowed alcohol to be used by “a rabbi, minister 
of the gospel, priest” and other religious officials “for sacramental 
purposes, or like religious rights.”227 In other words, the problem the 
Act sought to address was not that alcohol was inherently too 
dangerous to be used, but that particular uses were viewed as posing 
threats to the moral and social order. 
While the Controlled Substances Act lacks the overt moralism of 
the temperance movement—and while the motivations behind the 
“war on drugs” are admittedly numerous and complex—the 
criminalization of “recreational” drug use likewise appears to reflect 
moral condemnation of practices that are “perceived to violate 
fundamental moral values.”228 Although the Act purports to restrict 
access to controlled substances to protect users’ health, the 
incongruous scheduling of many drugs appears designed instead as a 
means of combatting social deviance—“an aspirational endeavor . . . 
[that] seeks to forge notions of whom and what we should be 
 
 225.  License Cases, 46 U.S. 504, 521; see also id. at 577 (Taney, J.) (“[I]f any State 
deems the retail and internal traffic in ardent spirits injurious to its citizens, and calculated to 
produce idleness, vice, or debauchery, I see nothing in the Constitution of the United States to 
prevent it from regulating and restraining the traffic, or from prohibiting it altogether, if it 
thinks proper.”). 
 226.  Volstead Act, ch. 85, tit. II, 41 Stat. 305, §7 (1919). 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Kimani Paul-Emile, Making Sense of Drug Regulation: A Theory of Law for Drug 
Control Policy, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 710 (2009–2010). 
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individually and collectively.”229 In particular, Schedule I ostensibly 
includes only drugs that are considered to have “a high potential for 
abuse,” that are deemed to have “no currently accepted medical 
use,” and that cannot be used safely, even under medical 
supervision.230 Yet that category includes several drugs that have 
known therapeutic uses and that appear to pose less potential for 
abuse than drugs in lower schedules—or, in the case of alcohol and 
cigarettes, no schedule at all.231 
Marijuana is the most notable example. At the time of the CSA’s 
passage, marijuana was placed in Schedule I pending a report to be 
issued by a National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse.232 
The Commission concluded that the drug posed little danger of 
physical or psychological harm, and that “the actual and potential 
harm of use of the drug is not great enough to justify intrusion by 
the criminal law into private behavior.”233 But rather than accepting 
the findings of the Commission it had created, the Nixon 
administration rejected these findings and left marijuana in Schedule 
I. In audio recordings of Nixon’s Oval Office conversations about 
the Commission’s work, the President drew a curious distinction 
between drinking to “have a good time” and smoking marijuana to 
“get high,” arguing that the latter was (along with homosexuality) 
immoral and “the enem[y] of strong societies.”234 
Marijuana remains in Schedule I today, while cocaine, 
methamphetamine, and other narcotics and stimulants are in 
Schedule II. These prescription drugs pose substantial health threats 
to users, including a high potential for addiction and fatal overdoses. 
By contrast, an Institute of Medicine (IOM) report commissioned 
by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy 
determined that “marijuana’s abuse potential appears relatively small 
 
 229.  Id. at 709. 
 230.  21 U.S.C § 812(b)(1). 
 231.  Paul-Emile, supra note 228, at 698. 
 232.  Pub. L. No. 91–513, § 601 Part F, 84 Stat. 1236, 1280–81 (1970). 
 233.  THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG 
ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING (1972), 
www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/nc/ncmenu.htm. 
 234.  Audio Tape: Presidential Recordings, Tape 498, Part I, (May, 1971) (available at 
http://millercenter.org/presidentialrecordings/rmn-e498a) (transcribed at 
www.csdp.org/research/nixonpot.txt). 
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and certainly within manageable limits for patients under the care of 
a physician.”235 While more than twenty-two thousand people die in 
the United States each year from prescription drug overdoses,236 the 
IOM found that “[t]o our knowledge no marijuana user has ever 
died of such an overdose.”237 
Moreover, while Schedule I is ostensibly reserved for drugs that 
have no medical uses, there is considerable evidence that marijuana 
can offer substantial therapeutic benefits238—despite the Drug 
Enforcement Administration’s hard-fought campaign to obstruct 
research aimed at investigating the drug’s therapeutic qualities.239 
Belying the claim that marijuana has “no currently accepted medical 
use,” many reputable medical associations and patient advocacy 
groups have affirmed marijuana’s therapeutic value and twenty-three 
states permit the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.240 
Other banned drugs—including psilocybin, LSD, and MDMA—
have shown significant therapeutic promise, and there is little 
evidence these drugs could not be used safely under appropriate 
medical supervision.241 The assignment of these drugs to Schedule I 
appears to be based not on objective assessments of their safety for 
 
 235.  INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE 
BASE 58 (1999). 
 236.  Sabrina Tavernise, Overdose Deaths Continue to Climb, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013, 
www.nytimes.com/2013/02/20/us/overdose-deaths-continue-to-climb.html?_r=0. 
 237.  INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 235, at 50. 
 238.  Paul-Emile, supra note 228, at 732 n.174. 
 239.  DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE & MAPS, THE DEA: FOUR DECADES OF IMPEDING AND 
REJECTING SCIENCE 2 (2014), https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA-
MAPS_DEA_Science_Final.pdf (describing tactics the DEA has used “to maintain the existing, 
scientifically unsupported drug scheduling system and to obstruct research that might alter 
current drug schedules.”). 
 240.  See, e.g., NORML, Health Organizations Supporting Immediate Legal Access to 
Medical Marijuana, http://norml.org/component/zoo/item/detailed-
reference?category_id=734 (last visited Nov. 4, 2015); 23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and 
DC, PROCON.ORG, 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last visited Nov. 
4, 2015) (listing states that have legalized marijuana for medicinal purposes). 
 241.  Lauren Slater, How Psychedelic Drugs Can Help Patients Face Death, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Apr. 20, 2012, at 56 (describing research at Johns Hopkins, NYU, and elsewhere into 
using psilocybin and LSD to treat anxiety in terminally ill patients); MAPS, Treating PTSD 
with MDMA-Assisted Psychotherapy: Research, www.mdmaptsd.org/research-category.html 
(listing published studies suggesting MDMA can be an effective therapy for PTSD). 
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human consumption, but on condemnation of altering consciousness 
in particular ways. 
2. Prohibition is costly and fails to deter forbidden practices 
From Prohibition to the war on drugs, punitive efforts have been 
ineffective in preventing people from using drugs to modify 
consciousness in desired ways, despite the substantial risks these 
practices sometimes entail for users. In 2007, there were more than 
1.8 million arrests for drug law violations—a more than threefold 
increase since 1980.242 More than 80 percent of drug arrests in 2012 
were for mere possession of a controlled substance.243 Possessing or 
distributing banned drugs can result in lengthy prison sentences, 
asset forfeiture, termination of employment, and many other dire 
consequences.244 Yet, while the United States spends billions each 
year on combatting the illegal drug trade, those expenditures appear 
to do little to reduce the availability of drugs or consumer demand 
for them.245 “Drug users in the United States spend on the order of 
$100 billion annually on cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and meth.”246 
According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, “[a]bout 40 
 
 242.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUG AND CRIME FACTS, 
www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/tables/arrtot.cfm. 
 243.  FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN 
THE UNITED STATES 2012 – ARRESTS 1 (2013). 
 244.  See, e.g., Martin Y. Iguchi, et al., Elements of Well-Being Affected By Criminalizing 
The Drug User, 117 (Supp. 1) PUBLIC HEALTH REP. 146 (2002) (“State and federal policies 
on drug felons may affect eight elements of personal and community well-being: children and 
families, access to health benefits, access to housing benefits, access to assistance for higher 
education, immigration status, employment, eligibility to vote, and drug use or recidivism.”); 
Nora V. Demleitner, Collateral Damage: No Re-Entry for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 
1027 (2002). 
 245.  EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET: FY 2015 FUNDING HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/press-releases/ondcp_fy16_budget_ 
highlights.pdf (in 2014, Congress allocated $25.2 billion “to reduce drug use and its 
consequences”); The NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, SHOVELING UP II: THE IMPACT OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE ON STATE 
BUDGETS 58 (2009) (“While international efforts to step up drug seizures may affect 
availability, price, and consequences associated with a particular drug (i.e., cocaine or heroin), 
CASA was unable to find evidence that such strategies have an overall impact on reducing 
substance abuse and addiction or its costs to government.”). 
 246.  BEAU KILMER ET AL., WHAT AMERICA’S USERS SPEND ON ILLEGAL DRUGS: 2000-
2010 103 (2014). 
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percent of high school seniors admit to having taken some illegal 
drug in the last year—up from thirty percent two decades ago.”247 
Despite that increasing demand, the average price of a gram of pure 
cocaine has declined by 74 percent over the past thirty years, 
suggesting an enormous increase in supply of the drug.248 In sum, 
despite the seemingly minimal benefits of many banned drugs, the 
incredibly harsh penalties for their sale and possession, and the 
enormous investments in trying to prevent their use, these drugs 
continue to be widely available and commonly used. 
The difficulty of limiting access to desired drugs would be 
profoundly magnified in the context of interventions that offer more 
tangible benefits than the euphoria of cocaine or heroin. For many 
people the desire to transform one’s identity is so compelling that 
they will go to incredible lengths, and assume great risks, to make 
these changes.249 People who pursue sex changes often undergo 
multiple surgeries and take hormones for the rest of their lives. 
Athletes who use steroids must not only accept the health risks of 
these drugs, but must undertake punishing workouts to obtain the 
drugs’ desired effects. For others, the pursuit of extrinsic rewards—
such as competitive advantages in school or the workplace—may 
prove equally powerful. Already, people from all walks of life are 
taking prescription drugs in hopes of gaining a competitive edge by 
enhancing their cognition.250 If millions of people are willing to risk 
lengthy prison sentences to experience fleeting euphoria, presumably 
millions more would be willing to do so in order to obtain the more 
significant benefits enhancements may offer.251 
Moreover, unlike Schedule I drugs, most existing enhancements 
have—and future enhancements are likely to have—approved 
 
 247.  Eduardo Porter, Numbers Tell of Failure in Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at 
B1 (citing THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, MONITORING THE FUTURE 2011 NATIONAL 
SURVEY RESULTS, LONG-TERM TRENDS IN ANNUAL PREVALENCE OF USE OF VARIOUS 
DRUGS IN GRADE 12 (2011), http://monitoringthefuture.org/data/11data/pr11t16.pdf). 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 39. 
 250.  See supra notes 37–54 and accompanying text. 
 251.  Sahakian & Morein-Zamir, supra note 39, at 1159 (“We believe it would be 
difficult to stop the spread in use of cognitive enhancers given a global market in 
pharmaceuticals with increasingly easy online access. The drive for self-enhancement of 
cognition is likely to be as strong if not stronger than in the realms of ‘enhancement’ of beauty 
and sexual function.”). 
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therapeutic uses.252 “Study drugs” like Ritalin and Adderall are FDA-
approved as treatments for ADHD. Human growth hormone 
(HGH) can make normal kids taller, but it was originally approved as 
a treatment for pituitary problems.253 Steroids can help bodybuilders 
grow enormous muscles, but they can also help rebuild tissues that 
have been weakened by injuries or illnesses.254 While these drugs are 
legally available only with a prescription, their sale and manufacture 
is legal and common. Preventing people from using legal drugs in 
unapproved ways would be considerably more difficult than 
enforcing the ban on Schedule I drugs has been. Indeed, the wide 
availability of legal painkillers and stimulants may explain why abuse 
of prescription drugs is becoming more common than the use of 
banned substances.255 
Relatedly, the challenge of restricting nontherapeutic practices 
would be magnified by the fact that many enhancements may be 
safer—or perceived as safer—than banned drugs. Unlike Schedule I 
drugs, the FDA deems approved drugs to be safe enough for use in 
humans.256 In addition, the FDA regulates the production of 
prescription drugs, providing users with assurances of quality and 
non-adulteration that are absent for illegally manufactured 
banned drugs.257 
 
 252.  See Maartje Schermer et al., The Future of Psychopharmacological Enhancements: 
Expectations and Policies, 2 NEUROETHICS 75, 78 (2009). 
 253.  Peter Conrad & Deborah Potter, Human Growth Hormone and the Temptations of 
Biomedical Enhancement, 26 SOC. OF HEALTH & ILLNESS, 184, 187–88 (2004). 
 254. Anabolic Steroid (Oral Route, Parenteral Route), MAYO CLINIC, 
www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/anabolic-steroid-oral-route-parenteral-
route/description/drg-20069323 (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). 
 255.  Steven Reinberg, Prescription Painkillers Trail Only Marijuana in Abuse Rates, 
Report Shows, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 10, 2013, http://health.usnews.com/health-
news/news/articles/2013/01/10/prescription-painkillers-trail-only-marijuana-in-abuse-rates-
report-shows. 
 256.  Although the FDA assesses drugs’ safety in relation to their efficacy in treating 
specific indications, in many cases a drug may be no less safe, and no less beneficial, when used 
for enhancement purposes rather than therapy. For example, a person who is healthy, but very 
short gets no less benefit, and incurs no greater safety risk from using HGH to increase his 
height than an individual with a malfunctioning pituitary gland who uses the drug for the 
same purpose. 
 257.  Pete Stark, U.S. Taxpayers Are Funding Prescription Drug Abuse, USA TODAY: 
MAG. AM. SCENE, July 1991, at 88 (“Given an option between a white powder of unknown 
origin and quality and a pill with a manufacturer’s logo, made under U.S. government quality 
control, the decision for the abuser is easy.”). 
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Initial forays into restricting off-label uses of HGH illustrate the 
difficulty of trying to limit medical interventions to certain approved 
therapeutic uses. In 1990, Congress banned the distribution of 
HGH for nontherapeutic uses, such as enhancing athletic 
performance or combatting the effects of aging.258 However, law 
enforcement has faced substantial challenges in seeking to prevent 
patients from using the drug in unapproved ways. The U.S. 
Attorneys Civil Resource Manual notes the difficulty of obtaining 
evidence that a physician is prescribing HGH improperly, suggesting 
that prosecutors should consider making “‘controlled buys’ using 
undercover agents or informants” and issuing search warrants and 
grand jury subpoenas for physicians’ medical files.259 
For all the intrusiveness of undercover agents posing as patients 
and rifling through doctors’ medical files, the payoff is elusive. 
Despite the efforts of prosecutors—not to mention endless sports 
scandals and media stories—off-label use of HGH continues to 
soar.260 In 2006, the federal government began a crackdown in an 
attempt to reduce “misuse” of the drug.261 While the effort 
succeeded in reducing the flow of illicit supplies from Mexico, 
China, and India, domestic consumption of HGH nevertheless 
skyrocketed, with sales increasing 69 percent from 2005 to 2011.262 
Although endocrinologists estimate that patients who meet the 
diagnostic criteria for the approved uses of HGH would use roughly 
180,000 prescriptions or refills each year, in 2011 pharmacies filled 
nearly twice that many orders.263 Doctors who are motivated to 
prescribe the drug for off-label purposes seem to have little difficulty 
 
 258.  21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (1994) (“[W]hoever knowingly distributes . . . human 
growth hormone for any use in humans other than the treatment of a disease or other 
recognized medical condition, where such use has been authorized by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services . . . is guilty of an offense punishable by not more than 5 years 
in prison . . . .”). 
 259.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL 19 
(3d ed. 2012). 
 260.  Crackdown on Human Growth Hormone Instead Leads to Record Sales, 
OREGONLIVE (Dec. 21, 2012), 
www.oregonlive.com/today/index.ssf/2012/12/crackdown_on_human_growth_horm.html. 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Id. 
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crafting diagnoses in ways that “exploit wiggle room in the law 
restricting use of HGH.”264 
In sum, attempts to prevent people from using biological 
interventions to modify their bodies and minds have a poor track 
record, imposing significant costs while seeming to do little to 
prevent these practices. Restricting access to interventions that are 
reasonably safe, that have approved uses, and that offer important, 
tangible benefits is likely to fail even more profoundly than attempts 
to limit access to dangerous, banned substances that offer 
mere euphoria.265 
B. The Treatment/Enhancement Distinction Is a Poor Foundation for 
Regulatory Policy 
Further complicating the enforcement challenges of restricting 
uses of medical technology, the fundamental idea on which these 
reform proposals rest—a distinction between treatments and 
enhancements—is an unworkable basis for regulation. The concept 
of disease is too malleable, and diagnoses too subjective, to prevent 
people from using medical interventions in the ways that concern 
critics. Policies built on this foundation would simply increase the 
incentives to recast identity-modifying interventions as treatments 
for illnesses. 
Proponents of reform do not advocate preventing people from 
treating their illnesses and disabilities. Rather, they argue that 
regulators should be empowered to identify nontherapeutic uses of 
medical technology and subject only these practices to broader 
scrutiny and tighter restrictions. Fukuyama proposes that in 
distinguishing between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” uses of 
medical technology, “[o]ne obvious way to draw red lines is to 
distinguish between therapy and enhancement, directing research 
 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Prohibition is particularly ineffective at restricting access to drugs, which are 
commodities that can be easily distributed and do not require medical expertise to use. This 
approach might be more effective in the context of other forms of enhancement, such as 
surgeries or genetic interventions that require trained physicians to administer them. That said, 
one need not look far to find stories of physicians providing prohibited interventions or falsely 
claiming therapeutic purposes for cosmetic procedures, athletic enhancements, and 
prescription drug abuse. See id.; infra notes 272 and 294. 
03.LAMKIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  3:21 PM 
501 Regulating Identity  
 555 
toward the former while putting restrictions on the latter.”266 
Similarly, Fox argues, “[T]he FDA should distinguish medical 
products with enhancement capacities as a separate category called 
‘potential enhancement products.’”267 While purely therapeutic 
interventions would continue to be evaluated based on safety and 
efficacy, those with enhancement potential would be “earmarked for 
special analysis and consideration” to determine whether other moral 
or social concerns argue in favor of restricting enhancement uses.268 
This approach would face profound problems in distinguishing 
legitimate “therapies” for illnesses from ostensibly nontherapeutic 
“enhancements.” While it is easy to imagine we have a clear 
understanding about basic concepts like health, illness, and disability, 
on closer inspection we find disagreement and confusion. Most 
people probably would agree that Tay Sachs—a fatal condition 
afflicting newborn infants—is a terrible illness, and an intervention 
that cured it would be a treatment. Conversely, most probably would 
agree that giving humans wings, as one surgeon has proposed, would 
be a form of enhancement.269 But between the black and white of 
extreme examples lies a much broader grey area where there are no 
clear answers. 
“Behaviors do not come naturally labeled as ‘disease’ and 
‘nondisease;’ humans make those distinctions and . . . we regularly 
change them.”270 Within the philosophical literature a debate has 
raged for decades over how to define health and illness and 
distinguish treatment from enhancement—or whether such 
distinctions can be meaningfully drawn at all.271 
 
 266.  FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at 208. 
 267.  Fox, supra note 97, at 1194. 
 268.  Id. at 1194–95. 
 269.  Lauren Slater, Dr. Daedalus, HARPER’S MAG., July 2001, at 57. 
 270.  Henry T. Greely, Direct Brain Interventions to “Treat” Disfavored Human 
Behaviors: Ethical and Social Issues, 91 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 163, 163 
(2012); see also ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN AND THE 
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 29 (2012) (“Ability is a tyranny of the majority. If most people could 
flap their arms and fly, the inability to do so would be a disability. If most people were 
geniuses, those of moderate intelligence would be disastrously disadvantaged. There is no 
ontological truth enshrined in what we think of as good health; it is merely a convention, one 
that has been strikingly inflated in the past century.”). 
 271.  Christopher Boorse, On the Distinction between Disease and Illness, 5 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 49, 56–64 (1975); Thomas S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 AM. PSYCHOL. 113, 
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This controversy also routinely plays out in the policy context, 
particularly when people seek medical interventions at the public’s 
expense. Consider blepharoplasty—a procedure more commonly 
known as an “eyelid lift.” Cosmetic surgeons often market these lifts 
as a way to produce more youthful looking eyes, but the procedure 
can also help patients for whom sagging eyelids hinder their field of 
vision.272 From 2001 to 2011, the number of these procedures 
charged to Medicare more than tripled, prompting concern that tax 
dollars are being used to pay for many purely cosmetic procedures.273 
However, distinguishing between cosmetic eyelid lifts and those that 
should be deemed medically necessary is “notoriously difficult” to 
do.274 Even when a patient’s drooping eyelids interfere with her 
vision, blepharoplasty will produce a more youthful appearance as a 
“side-effect.”275 Doctors are skilled at documenting the therapeutic 
benefits patients receive from these procedures, making claims of 
improper Medicare billing difficult and expensive to prove.276 
The State of New Jersey encountered similar problems in seeking 
to enforce a tax on cosmetic surgery. That tax applied only to 
“medical procedures performed in order to improve the human 
subject’s appearance without significantly serving to prevent or treat 
illness or disease or to promote proper functioning of the body.”277 
The State repealed the tax just eight years after it was enacted, 
reportedly because disputes about whether procedures were cosmetic 
or therapeutic made collecting the taxes more expensive than the 
revenues generated.278 
 
114–15 (1960); Peter H. Schwartz, Defending the Distinction Between Treatment and 
Enhancement, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 17, 17–18 (2005). 
 272.  Joe Eaton & David Donald, Eyelid Lifts Skyrocket Among Medicare Patients, Costing 
Taxpayers Millions, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 28, 2013, 5:00 AM), 
www.publicintegrity.org/2013/05/28/12713/eyelid-lifts-skyrocket-among-medicare-
patients-costing-taxpayers-millions. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Cosmetic Medical Procedures Gross Receipts Tax, N.J.S.A. 54:32E-1 (2012). 
 278.  Christopher Beam, Breast Practices: Why Taxing Cosmetic Surgery Is a Bad Idea, 
SLATE (Nov. 3, 2009, 8:06 PM), 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2009/11/breast_practices.html (“[T]he 
only plan to tax cosmetic surgery so far, in New Jersey, has been a failure, costing $3 in 
administrative spending for every dollar of revenue. The main problem, apparently, has been 
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The challenge of distinguishing between therapy and 
enhancements is exponentially more difficult in the context of 
mental illnesses. This task requires deciding which variations of 
beliefs, emotions, and behaviors should be considered within the 
range of “normal” identities and which should be considered signs 
of illness. In the United States, we have largely delegated this task to 
the American Psychiatric Association, which publishes a 
compendium of mental illnesses called the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (the “DSM”). The volume is important 
not only to psychiatrists, but to policymakers, insurers, courts, 
schools, and others for whom it is relevant whether individuals 
should be considered mentally ill.279 
The DSM’s classifications and diagnostic criteria have been 
subjects of endless controversy. For example, the Association’s own 
research reveals that doctors faced with identical patients routinely 
reach opposite conclusions about the presence or absence of even the 
most common mental illnesses.280 In other words, practicing 
psychiatrists often disagree about whether particular patients suffer 
from depression (in which case prescribing antidepressants would 
constitute treatment), or whether the patients are not ill (so that 
prescribing drugs would constitute enhancement). 
There are no fMRI scans or blood tests that identify the presence 
of mental illness.281 Even if psychiatrists could identify physiological 
factors that reliably correlate with certain behaviors, emotions, or 
tendencies, this would not answer which of these variations should 
 
the difficulty in defining ‘elective’ versus ‘reconstructive’ surgery. Who decides whether an 
operation to fix your nasal breathing, which also happens to make your nose look straighter, is 
functional or aesthetic?”). 
 279.  Cia Bearden, The Reality of the DSM in the Legal Arena: A Proposition for 
Curtailing Undesired Consequences of an Imperfect Tool, 13 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79, 
82–84 (2012). 
 280.  Allen Frances, DSM-5 Field Trials Discredit the American Psychiatric Association, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 31, 2012), www.huffingtonpost.com/allen-frances/dsm-5-field-
trials-discre_b_2047621.html. 
 281.  See Thomas Insel, Director’s Blog: Transforming Diagnosis, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL 
HEALTH (Apr. 29, 2013), www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2013/transforming-
diagnosis.shtml (“Unlike our definitions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the 
DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any objective 
laboratory measure.”). 
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be categorized as illnesses rather than merely differences.282 Rather, 
determining whether a difference should be considered an illness is 
an inherently subjective determination—one that is inextricably tied 
to contested conceptions of the good life and influenced by 
contemporary social expectations and prejudices.283 
In 1851, a physician named Samuel Cartwright sounded the 
alarm over the spread of “drapetomania,” a dire affliction that caused 
slaves to flee captivity.284 Cartwright contended this illness could be 
treated with “proper medical advice, strictly followed”—he 
prescribed “whipping the devil out of them.”285 In The Protest 
Psychosis, Jonathan Metzl shows how psychiatry reflected the racial 
anxieties of the Civil Rights era by transforming schizophrenia from 
“an illness that afflicted nonviolent, white, petty criminals” to “a 
disorder of racialized aggression” disproportionately applied to black 
men.286 Black men arrested for participating in civil rights protests or 
destroying property during civil unrest were committed to insane 
asylums, where their medical charts included comments like 
“[p]aranoid against his doctors and the police” and “[w]ould be a 
danger to society were he not in an institution.”287 Perhaps most 
notoriously, for decades the American Psychiatric Association 
identified homosexuality as a pathological “sexual deviation,” 
alongside sadism and necrophilia. Following a sustained campaign by 
 
 282.  As Robert Spitzer, a leading architect of the DSM, wrote about debates regarding 
whether homosexuality should be considered a mental illness, “Often in discussions of this 
kind a hope is expressed that some biological ‘abnormality,’ such as an endocrine or genetic 
disturbance, will be discovered and will resolve the issue once and for all. It is hard to see how 
this would answer the question any more than would knowledge of the biological cause or 
antecedents of left-handedness (surely there must be one) indicate whether that condition 
should be regarded as a normal variant or pathology.” Robert L. Spitzer, The Diagnostic Status 
of Homosexuality in DSM-III: A Reformulation of the Issues, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 210, 
213 (1981). 
 283.  Id. at 214 (“The concept of ‘disorder’ always involves a value judgment.”). 
 284.  Samuel A. Cartwright, Diseases and Peculiarities of the Negro Race, XI DEBOW’S 
REVIEW (1851). 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Christopher Lane, How Schizophrenia Became a Black Disease: An Interview with 
Jonathan Metzl, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 5, 2010), www.psychologytoday.com/blog/side-
effects/201005/how-schizophrenia-became-black-disease-interview-jonathan-metzl. See 
generally JONATHAN M. METZL, THE PROTEST PSYCHOSIS: HOW SCHIZOPHRENIA BECAME A 
BLACK DISEASE (2010). 
 287.  Lane, supra note 286. 
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gay activists, the APA finally removed homosexuality from the DSM 
in 1973, and today, it is increasingly viewed not as a disorder, but as 
a valid identity.288 Following this example, in recent years many other 
groups have argued that traits labeled as illnesses and disabilities—
such as deafness, autism, and transsexualism—are simply different 
identities that should be respected and accommodated rather 
than treated.289 
The blurriness of the distinction between identity and illness 
often cuts the other way as well, with traits and behaviors once 
viewed as elements of personality or character being re-
conceptualized as forms of illness—a process referred to as 
“medicalization.”290 While “drunkenness” and “gluttony” were once 
viewed as character flaws, today they are often characterized as the 
mental illnesses “alcohol use disorder” and “binge eating 
disorder.”291 A person who is tired as a result of working the night 
shift can be diagnosed with “shift work sleep disorder” and treated 
with stimulants.292 Virtually any life challenge or shortcoming (e.g., 
picky eating, temper tantrums, or excessive shopping) can be 
characterized as an illness (like “selective eating disorder,” 
 
 288.  Kenneth J. Zucker & Robert L. Spitzer, Was the Gender Identity Disorder of 
Childhood Diagnosis Introduced into DSM-III as a Backdoor Maneuver to Replace 
Homosexuality? A Historical Note, 31 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 31, 31 (2005); 
Homosexuality Not an Illness, Chinese Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001, 
www.nytimes.com/2001/03/08/health/08PSYC.html (stating Japan and China removed 
homosexuality as mental illness in 1995 and 2001, respectively). 
 289.  SOLOMON, supra note 270, at 18 (“The reasonable corollary to the queer 
experience is that everyone has a defect, that everyone has an identity, and that they are often 
one and the same.”); Andrew Solomon, The Autism Rights Movement, N.Y. MAG. (May 25, 
2008), http://nymag.com/news/features/47225/; Andrew Solomon, Defiantly Deaf, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Aug. 28, 1994), www.nytimes.com/1994/08/28/magazine/defiantly-
deaf.html?pagewanted=all. 
 290.  Peter Conrad & Valerie Leiter, Medicalization, Markets and Consumers, 45 J. 
HEALTH SOC. BEHAV. 158, 158 (2004). 
 291. Alcohol Use Disorders, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, 
www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/overview-alcohol-consumption/alcohol-use-disorders (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2015); Feeding and Eating Disorders, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
www.dsm5.org/Documents/Eating%20Disorders%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 
4, 2015). 
 292.  Shift Work Sleep Disorder, CLEVELAND CLINIC, 
http://my.clevelandclinic.org/neurological_institute/sleep-disorders-center/disorders-
conditions/hic-shift-work-sleep-disorder.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2015). 
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“intermittent explosive disorder,” and “compulsive 
buying disorder”).293 
Singling out enhancement practices for special restrictions, as 
reformers propose, would increase the incentives—among drug 
companies, patients, and physicians—to characterize social problems 
as medical conditions needing treatment. Patients who want 
particular interventions—and the companies that want to sell them—
would share a common interest in ensuring that those interventions 
were thought of as treating recognized illnesses, rather than labeled 
as “enhancements.” For their part, doctors have already 
demonstrated their willingness to stretch diagnostic criteria to justify 
prescribing interventions to suffering patients.294 By broadening the 
conditions that are considered to be illnesses, these stakeholders 
could work an end-run around regulations that aim to restrict 
nontherapeutic practices.295 
Changing whether a behavior or emotional response is normal or 
disordered can be as simple as tweaking the diagnostic criteria in the 
 
 293.  Patti Neighmond, Road Rage: A Symptom of Much More than Bad Traffic?, NPR 
(Dec. 12, 2011), www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/12/12/143457950/road-rage-a-
symptom-of-much-more-than-bad-traffic; Eating Disorders, DUKE MED., 
www.dukemedicine.org/treatments/psychiatry/eating-disorders (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) 
(“Picky or selective eating services: We are at the forefront of care for this newly recognized 
eating problem, where children and adults severely restrict the types of food they eat, or reject 
foods on the basis of taste, texture or sensory quality.”); Donald W. Black, A Review of 
Compulsive Buying Disorder, 6 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 14, 14 (2007). 
 294.  See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 59 (describing psychiatrist Peter Kramer’s experiences 
prescribing Prozac to help patients whom he believed did not meet diagnostic criteria for 
mental illnesses); Leona Cuttler et al., Short Stature and Growth Hormone Therapy: A National 
Study of Physician Recommendation Patterns, 276 JAMA 531, 533 (1996) (ninety-four percent 
of surveyed endocrinologists reported having recommended HGH to increase the height of 
children who were not suffering from growth hormone deficiencies); BEYOND THERAPY, supra 
note 88, at 306 (“With the decline in the cultural authority of religious institutions, and with 
the shrinking of other communal systems of help and support for people in difficulty, 
physicians often find themselves simply ‘neighbor to the problem.’ Rightly extending a helping 
hand, they often conceive and treat the problems they encounter in a purely 
medical fashion.”). 
 295.  Drug companies, doctors, and patients already have substantial incentives to 
medicalize unpleasant conditions because insurers will only pay for interventions that are 
deemed medically necessary. However, as the enormous cosmetic surgery market amply 
demonstrates, nontherapeutic interventions can be very profitable even when patients must pay 
out of their own pockets. Banning certain off-label interventions altogether would pose a 
much bigger threat to the profits of drug and device companies, heightening the importance 
to this industry of ensuring that these interventions are considered therapeutic. 
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DSM. For example, when the APA first recognized “social anxiety 
disorder” (SAD) in 1980, it was an obscure diagnosis with an 
estimated prevalence of roughly 2.75 percent.296 Following a 
loosening of the criteria used to diagnose SAD—and an aggressive 
marketing campaign by the maker of Paxil, an antidepressant 
approved to treat the condition—by the 1990s that figure had 
quadrupled, with studies estimating one out of every eight 
Americans suffered from the illness.297 Attention disorders reflect a 
similar trajectory. Again, following a loosening of diagnostic criteria 
and a multi-pronged public relations effort by drug makers,298 the 
number of children diagnosed with ADHD rose by more than 40 
percent in the past decade.299 Today, 11 percent of all school-age 
children—and roughly 20 percent of high school-age boys—are 
diagnosed with this condition.300 It is unlikely that substantially more 
people are extremely fearful of social situations today than they were 
in 1980, or that 40 percent more children have difficulty 
concentrating than they did a decade ago. Rather, levels of shyness 
and distractedness that we used to think of as normal, if sometimes 
disadvantageous, are now characterized as forms of mental illness 
that are legitimate targets for drug therapy. 
Perhaps no shift better illustrates the slipperiness of the concept 
of mental illness than recent changes to the DSM’s definition of 
“major depressive disorder,” which includes criteria such as 
“depressed mood” and “loss of interest or pleasure” for a period of 
at least two weeks.301 Until recently, the DSM included a 
“bereavement exclusion” under which a person who had experienced 
the death of a loved one was not considered depressed unless these 
 
 296.  Allan V. Horwitz, Creating Mental Illness in Non-Disordered Community 
Populations, in ESTABLISHING MEDICAL REALITY: ESSAYS IN THE METAPHYSICS AND 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE 130 (Harold Kincaid & Jennifer McKitrick, 
eds. 2007). 
 297.  Id.; Conrad & Leiter, supra note 290, 163–64. 
 298.  Alan Schwartz, The Selling of Attention Deficit Disorder, N.Y. TIMES, December 14, 
2013, at A1. 
 299.  Alan Schwarz & Sarah Cohen, A.D.H.D. Seen in 11% of U.S. Children as Diagnoses 
Rise, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 2013, at A1. 
 300.  Id. 
 301. Major Depressive Disorder, in DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (American Psychiatric Association, ed., 5th ed., 2013) (ebook), 
http://dsm.psychiatryonline.org/content.aspx?bookid=556&sectionid=41101760#1034374 \9. 
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symptoms lasted more than two months—in recognition of the fact 
that grief is a normal, not disordered, response to a loved one’s 
death.302 However, the latest version of the DSM excised that 
exclusion.303 The result is that a person may be diagnosed as mentally 
ill if she experiences persistent feelings of sadness or emptiness for 
more than two weeks after the death of her spouse or child.304 
If prescribing drugs to relieve this kind of grief qualifies as 
“treatment,” it is hard to see how regulators could draw any 
defensible lines that would differentiate treatment of mental illnesses 
from elective modification of emotions. 
Reform proponents might argue that an agency with broad 
powers to regulate the uses of medical technology could serve as a 
bulwark against increasing medicalization, drawing lines that separate 
treatment from enhancement.305 But because there is no objective 
way to determine which types of distress should be characterized as 
illnesses, such an agency would be forced to draw distinctions that 
are inherently arbitrary and are wed to contemporary prejudices and 
contested notions of the good life. Such a body would be charged 
with determining which kinds of psychic distress are forms of illness 
and which are valid identities, personalities, or quirks. It would be 
responsible for determining what levels of anxiety, social discomfort, 
trouble concentrating, cognitive performance, or grief are sufficient 
to merit treatment, and what levels people should simply have to live 
with. Had this kind of authority existed in the 1970s, when 
homosexuality was categorized as a mental illness and gender 
 
 302.  Paula Span, Grief Over New Depression Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, 
http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/grief-over-new-depression-diagnosis/. 
 303.  AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER AND THE 
“BEREAVEMENT EXCLUSION” (2013), 
www.dsm5.org/Documents/Bereavement%20Exclusion%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 
 304.  Megan Brooks, The Case for Retaining Bereavement Exclusion in DSM-5, 
MEDSCAPE (Feb. 6, 2012), www.medscape.com/viewarticle/758097. 
 305.  For example, Fukuyama argues that “even in the cases where the borderline 
between sickness and health, therapy and enhancement, is murkier, regulatory agencies are 
routinely able to make these distinctions in practice.” FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at 209–10. 
However, Fukuyama bases his argument on the incorrect claim that CSA-scheduled drugs like 
Ritalin can only be taken therapeutically. Id. at 210. In fact, the CSA does not bar physicians 
from prescribing drugs off-label for nontherapeutic purposes. Indeed, Fukuyama himself 
believes Ritalin “is overprescribed in the United States and used in situations in which parents 
and teachers ought to employ more traditional means of engaging children and shaping their 
characters.” Id. at 210. 
03.LAMKIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  3:21 PM 
501 Regulating Identity  
 563 
identity disorder was not, regulators might have endorsed “treating” 
the illness of homosexuality while disallowing sex reassignment 
surgery on the grounds that it constituted improper “enhancement.” 
The intrusiveness of this kind of regulatory authority becomes 
apparent when one considers the myriad other ways people can 
change their brains and bodies.306 Consider a drug that produced the 
same behavioral and personality changes as meditation practice. If 
such a drug raised concerns about undermining human agency or 
authenticity, those concerns would seem to apply equally to 
meditation. If it is appropriate for government to restrict access to 
the drug on these bases, it is not clear why that power should be 
limited to biomedical interventions. Yet presumably most people 
would recoil at the thought of empowering a regulator to try to 
prevent people from meditating—or exercising, changing their diets, 
or employing any of the other methods people use to change their 
physical and emotional states. 
In the context of biological interventions, we empower 
government to operate paternalistically because these interventions 
pose potential health risks that most laypeople are not well-
positioned to evaluate. Clinical trials provide regulators objective 
ways to assess and measure the physical risks posed by drugs. This 
limited basis for accepting paternalism in the context of biological 
interventions provides a limiting principle for government 
interference. But if it is appropriate to expand medical regulation 
beyond these parameters to “adjudicate among competing ethical 
claims,”307 it is not clear why that power should be limited to 
biomedical interventions. Regulators would have no objective basis 
for making these determinations, nor would they be better 
positioned to make these assessments than the individuals who wish 
to use these technologies.308 
 
 306.  See, e.g., Greely et al., supra note 37, at 703 (“Drugs may seem distinctive among 
enhancements in that they bring about their effects by altering brain function, but in reality so 
does any intervention that enhances cognition. Recent research has identified beneficial neural 
changes engendered by exercise, nutrition and sleep, as well as instruction and reading. In 
short, cognitive-enhancing drugs seem morally equivalent to other, more 
familiar, enhancements.”). 
 307.  FUKUYAMA & FURGER, supra note 2, at 17. 
 308.  These distinctions may continue to be necessary in the context of paying for 
medical interventions. Public and private health insurance systems can define for themselves 
the boundaries of their coverage, and insurers and patients can battle over whether particular 
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In some cases, restricting medical practices that have profound 
implications for one’s identity is tantamount to restricting who 
people are allowed to become—how they look, think, and behave. 
Proposals to empower a regulatory agency to make decisions of that 
sort, particularly to enforce conceptions of morality that many 
people do not share, should give pause. 
C. Government Should Not Interfere with Deeply Personal Medical 
Decisions to Enforce Contested Moral Views 
Although arbitrary and contentious distinctions are unavoidable 
features of many regulatory systems, these attributes are troubling in 
the context of interfering with deeply personal decisions involving 
modifying one’s own body or mind. The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized—specifically in cases regarding access to 
medical interventions—that government should not intrude on these 
types of decisions to enforce contested views of morality. These cases 
affirm that while limited restrictions may be justified to protect 
patient health, such interference is improper when undertaken to 
enforce prevailing morality. While assessing the constitutionality of 
restricting access to identity-modifying interventions is beyond the 
scope of this article, the Court’s reasoning in these cases argues for 
caution in expanding government power to regulate medical 
interventions on moral grounds. 
1. Many decisions regarding medical interventions are protected from 
undue state interference 
Fukuyama contends that the propriety of regulating medical 
interventions to enforce prevailing morality should 
be uncontroversial: 
 
interventions fall within their policies’ contractual terms. But declining to pay for certain 
interventions—particularly by private insurers—is far less intrusive than barring people from 
obtaining interventions for themselves. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) 
(finding that a woman’s constitutional right to be free from undue state interference in 
obtaining nontherapeutic abortions does not also entail “a constitutional entitlement to the 
financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.”). But see STEPHEN 
HOLMES & CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 
(1999) (arguing that the distinction between positive and negative rights is illusory). 
03.LAMKIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  3:21 PM 
501 Regulating Identity  
 565 
The answer to the question of who gets to decide on the legitimate 
and illegitimate uses of science is actually pretty simple, and has 
been established by several centuries of political theory and 
practice: it is the democratically constituted political community, 
acting chiefly through their elected representatives, that is 
sovereign in these matters and has authority to control the pace 
and scope of technological development.309 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized 
the legitimacy of regulating medical interventions. In 1921, the 
Court explained that “[t]here can be no question of the authority of 
the State in the exercise of its police power to regulate the 
administration, sale, prescription and use of dangerous and habit-
forming drugs”—a power the Court characterized as “so manifest in 
the interest of the public health and welfare, that it is unnecessary to 
enter upon a discussion of it beyond saying that it is too firmly 
established to be successfully called in question.”310 
Yet the State’s power to regulate medical interventions is not 
unlimited. Where medical interventions affect bodily integrity or 
identity in fundamental ways, the Court has repeatedly recognized 
that individuals’ decisions about these interventions can implicate a 
“realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.”311 
Many of these cases involve individuals’ rights to refuse medical 
interventions. In Winston v. Lee, the Court rejected state prosecutors’ 
request to have a bullet surgically removed from a criminal 
defendant’s chest, citing “the extent of intrusion upon the 
individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily 
integrity.”312 Other cases recognize that control over one’s body can 
intertwine with interests involving defining one’s identity. The Court 
has repeatedly determined that administering drugs to change 
prisoners’ and criminal defendants’ thinking and behavior implicates 
 
 309.  FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at 186. 
 310.  Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921). 
 311.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992); see also id. at 927 
(Blackmun, J. concurring) (“These cases embody the principle that personal decisions that 
profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and destiny should be largely beyond the reach 
of government.”). 
 312.  Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 
165, 172 (1952) (subjecting a criminal suspect to “stomach pumping” against his will in order 
to determine whether he had swallowed drugs “shock[ed] the conscience” and violated the 
suspect’s due process rights). 
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constitutionally protected liberties.313 In Washington v. Harper, the 
Court affirmed that even prisoners—whose rights are severely 
circumscribed—“possess[] a significant liberty interest in avoiding 
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs,” emphasizing 
that the purpose of administering these drugs was “to alter the 
chemical balance in a patient’s brain” in order to produce 
“changes . . . in his or her cognitive processes.”314 
While the aforementioned cases recognize a liberty interest in 
refusing unwanted medical interventions, the Court has also 
repeatedly recognized a protected interest in accessing desired 
interventions—including for nontherapeutic purposes—free from 
unwarranted government interference.315 Although to date these 
cases have involved reproduction technologies, they are instructive 
here because they involve government efforts to restrict 
nontherapeutic medical practices on the basis of moral concerns 
other than safety. 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court struck down a Massachusetts’ 
statute that prohibited unmarried persons from using contraceptives 
to prevent pregnancy.316 In the present context, the Eisenstadt 
decision has three notable features. First, the challenged law 
distinguished between therapeutic and nontherapeutic uses of 
contraception and singled out the latter for restrictions. The statute 
permitted all individuals to use contraceptives to protect their health. 
 
 313.  See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (finding that “[t]he forcible 
injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body . . . represents a substantial 
interference with that person’s liberty” and that “[i]n the case of antipsychotic drugs . . . that 
inference is particularly severe,” in part because of how the drugs affect the individual’s 
cognitive processes) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)); Vitek v. 
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (finding that subjecting prisoners to involuntary psychiatric 
treatment, including “mandatory behavior modification,” constitutes “the kind of deprivations 
of liberty that requires procedural protections”); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) 
(“[F]orced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render [a criminal defendant] competent 
to stand trial unconstitutionally deprive[d] him of his ‘liberty’ to reject medical treatment.”). 
 314.  Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22, 229 (1990); see also id. at 237–38 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen the purpose or effect of forced drugging is to alter the will 
and the mind of the subject, it constitutes a deprivation of liberty in the most literal and 
fundamental sense.”). 
 315.  Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 927 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Just as the 
Due Process Clause protects the deeply personal decision of the individual to refuse medical 
treatment, it also must protect the deeply personal decision to obtain 
medical treatment . . . .”). 
 316.  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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The sole effect of the challenged law was to bar single individuals 
from using contraceptives for a nontherapeutic purpose: preventing 
pregnancy.317 Second, the Court determined that using 
contraceptives to prevent pregnancy implicates matters 
“fundamentally affecting a person,” even when such interventions 
are not used for therapeutic purposes.318 Finally, the Court rejected 
the contention that the law’s purpose was to promote safety, noting 
that the statute “was cast only in terms of morals.”319 The Court’s 
emphasis of this point suggests it might have been receptive to the 
statute had its purpose been to promote safety rather than to enforce 
a particular morality. 
The Court’s key abortion cases reflect the same features: because 
the decision of whether to bear a child implicates women’s bodily 
integrity and identity in fundamental ways, the Constitution limits 
the State’s authority to restrict access to abortion on the basis of 
contested moral doctrines—even with respect to abortions that are 
not undertaken to protect a woman’s health. In Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, the Court emphasized that abortion implicates “the urgent 
claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny 
and her body,” which the Court identified as “central to personal 
dignity and autonomy” and “implicit in the meaning of liberty.”320 In 
an often-quoted passage, the Court explained that “[a]t the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs 
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under compulsion of the State.”321 
As in Eisenstadt, the Casey Court determined that respecting 
these personal choices requires protecting access not only to 
 
 317.  Id. at 442 (“The statutory scheme distinguishes among three distinct classes of 
distributees—first, married persons may obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, but only 
from doctors or druggists on prescription; second, single persons may not obtain contraceptives 
from anyone to prevent pregnancy; and, third, married or single persons may obtain 
contraceptives from anyone to prevent, not pregnancy, but the spread of disease.”). 
 318.  Id. at 453. 
 319.  Id. at 450. 
 320.  Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 869, 923; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 
(1973) (observing that pregnancy and motherhood not only present health risks to the 
woman’s body, but that “[m]aternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a 
distressful life and future”). 
 321.  Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851. 
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abortions undertaken for medical reasons, but to nontherapeutic 
procedures as well. The Court held that prior to fetal viability the 
State may not unduly interfere with a woman’s decision to terminate 
a pregnancy, even when an abortion is not therapeutic—i.e., not 
necessary to protect the woman’s health. The Court expressly 
rejected the contention that States could prohibit all abortions 
undertaken for nontherapeutic reasons and permit them only “in 
those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to 
[a woman’s] own life or health . . . .”322 
Also as in Eisenstadt, the Casey Court distinguished between 
States’ legitimate interests in protecting maternal health and 
improper attempts to regulate deeply personal decisions regarding 
reproduction to enforce particular conceptions of morality. The 
Court acknowledged the power of the State to “enact regulations to 
further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion,” and 
affirmed the validity of several regulations that it concluded 
furthered that goal.323 But while the Court recognized the State’s 
interest in protecting potential human life as a valid basis for 
restricting some abortions, it deemed even that compelling interest 
insufficient to overcome a woman’s right to an abortion before fetal 
viability. The Court expressly rejected the contention that the State 
could interfere with these decisions based solely on contested 
moral grounds: 
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose 
some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual 
implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. 
Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic 
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own 
moral code. The underlying constitutional issue is whether the 
State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive 
way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter.324 
 
 322.  Id. at 850–51. 
 323.  Id. at 878. 
 324.  Id. at 850. 
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The Court rejected that power, instead determining that “[t]he 
destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own 
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”325 
2. Enhancement technologies can likewise implicate individual liberty 
in fundamental ways 
Mindful of the seemingly broad implications of its conclusion 
that due process enshrines a right to “define one’s own concept of 
existence,” the Casey Court took pains to limit the applicability of its 
decision in other contexts, opining that with respect to pregnancy 
“the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human 
condition and so unique to the law.”326 Yet other medical 
interventions could implicate bodily integrity and identity in similarly 
fundamental ways. Indeed, some of the most potent concerns 
regarding enhancements are driven precisely by the power of these 
interventions to profoundly shape individuals’ identities by 
modifying their bodies and brains. 
Consider the increasingly plausible prospect of memory-editing 
interventions. If a pharmaceutical company developed a drug that 
erased specific memories, it might seek FDA approval for the drug as 
a therapy for PTSD, emphasizing its potential to help people erase 
memories of traumatic events.327 While many people might find this 
approach to treating PTSD troubling,328 that concern would pale 
compared to the outcry when doctors began prescribing these 
interventions “off label” to help people erase painful memories that 
fall short of disabling, such as experiences of loss, embarrassment, 
or shame.329 
This is precisely the kind of intervention that a regulatory body 
charged with “discriminat[ing] between those technological 
 
 325.  Id. at 852. 
 326.  Id. at 851. 
 327.  BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 207 (“To be sure, these agents—and their 
better versions, yet to come—are, for now at least, being developed not as means for drug-
induced happiness but rather as agents for combating major depression or preventing post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Yet once available for those purposes, they could also be 
used to ease the soul and enhance the mood of nearly anyone.”). 
 328.  For a discussion of concerns raised by memory modification, see supra 
Section I.B.7. 
 329.  BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 207. 
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advances that promote human flourishing, and those that pose a 
threat to human dignity and well-being” might choose to restrict.330 
Yet the very concerns that might motivate such restrictions 
demonstrate how profoundly this would interfere with individuals’ 
abilities to forge their own identities and define their own 
personhood. Indeed, the President’s Council on Bioethics grounded 
its concerns about memory erasure on the premise that memory is 
“central to human flourishing” and is a fundamental element of the 
“pursuit of happiness.”331 The Council worried that “an unchecked 
power to erase memories . . . could imperil our capacity to form a 
strong and coherent personal identity,”332 arguing that our memory 
allows us to know who we are and “preserves for us the complex 
web of lived experiences that furnish our sense of self.”333 Dr. Eric R. 
Kandel, a Nobel Prize-winning neuroscientist and leading memory 
researcher, has also expressed concern about memory-editing 
technologies, arguing that “we are who we are. We’re all part of 
what we’ve experienced.”334 
According to these critics’ own assessments, then, erasing 
memories is troubling because it profoundly implicates how an 
individual “define[s] one’s own concept of existence.”335 In other 
words, the very concerns that might animate restrictions on memory 
erasure make a compelling argument that the use of such 
interventions falls squarely within the “realm of personal liberty 
which the government may not enter.”336 Indeed, if anything the 
state’s interests appear more compelling in the context of abortion, 
where a potential human life is at stake, than with respect to memory 
 
 330.  FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at 182. 
 331.  BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 215. 
 332.  Id. at 212. 
 333.  Id. at 214. 
 334.  Claudia Dreifus, A Quest to Understand How Memory Works, N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 
2012, at D2; see also Lehrer, supra note 82 (“Being able to control memory doesn’t simply 
give us admin access to our brains. It gives us the power to shape nearly every aspect of our 
lives. There’s something terrifying about this.”). 
 335.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 336.  Id. at 847. Indeed, among the fundamental rights the Supreme Court has 
determined are implicit in the concept of liberty are “freedom of thought [and] belief.” 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 
(1969) (“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the 
power to control men’s minds.”). 
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erasure, where the state’s interests are more nebulous 
and speculative. 
Of course, given the broad range of interventions that have some 
effect on identity, many medical practices may not implicate personal 
liberty in such profound ways. Placing restrictions on seemingly 
trivial interventions like facelifts and “tummy tucks,” for example, 
would seem to be relatively minor intrusions. But neither do these 
practices seem sufficiently troubling to motivate imposing such 
restrictions. Thus, proponents of regulating medical interventions on 
moral grounds appear to face a Catch-22. The technologies that can 
most powerfully modify identities prompt the greatest moral 
concern, and thus the greatest impetus to restrict access to them. 
Yet, the greater the power of these interventions to shape identity, 
the more likely they are to implicate the kinds of decisions that 
should not be interfered with based on contested notions 
of morality. 
CONCLUSION 
There are compelling reasons to regulate medical interventions 
to protect health. Virtually everyone agrees that protecting human 
health is important. Medical interventions can pose substantial risks 
that laypeople are often ill-equipped to assess. Although FDA 
decisions regarding drug approvals can be controversial—e.g., 
because people disagree about the level of risk that is acceptable in 
relation to possible health benefits337—there is broad support for 
regulating drugs to protect health, and there are objective ways to 
measure drugs’ risks and benefits.338 Under these circumstances, it 
makes sense to have a body of experts assessing health risks and 
therapeutic benefits. 
 
 337.  See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von 
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that 
terminally ill patients are entitled to access to unapproved, experimental medications). 
 338.  See, e.g., Consumers Union, Poll: Consumers Want Host of Drug Safety Reforms 
(Apr. 16, 2007), http://consumersunion.org/news/poll-consumers-want-host-of-drug-
safety-reforms/ (reporting poll results finding that 96 percent of respondents supported 
government authority to require warning labels on potentially dangerous prescription drugs, 
and 93 percent supported giving the FDA the power to order follow-up safety studies on 
drugs that are already on the market). 
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The same cannot be said of determining how people should be 
permitted to use reasonably safe medical technologies to shape 
themselves. Unlike scientists assessing the health risks of drugs, there 
are no similarly authoritative experts regarding perceived moral 
dangers like agency and authenticity. While government can regulate 
on the basis of contested morality in many contexts, its power to 
interfere with deeply personal decisions affecting control over one’s 
body and mind should be limited. The power of individuals to make 
these decisions for themselves should be guarded jealously. 
On a pragmatic level, attempts to restrict access to medical 
interventions on moral grounds have fared poorly. Despite massive 
government expenditures, intrusive enforcement efforts, and often 
devastating consequences for individuals caught using banned 
interventions, these practices continue unabated. The challenges of 
enforcing these kinds of restrictions would be greatly magnified in 
the context of FDA-approved interventions, which meet a baseline 
of safety and may offer significant benefits to users. Moreover, 
imposing special restrictions only on interventions deemed 
nontherapeutic would increase incentives for drug companies, 
doctors, and patients to recast normal, unwanted conditions as 
diseases needing treatment. 
Rather than expanding government’s authority to interfere with 
medical decisions on moral grounds, we would be better served by 
scrubbing the existing systems of medical regulation of these kinds of 
judgments and recommitting ourselves to regulating medical 
interventions to protect health. Many existing restrictions that are 
ostensibly based on safety assessments are in fact motivated by 
voters’ moral condemnation of certain practices, leaving access to 
medical interventions prey to shifting political winds and the whims 
of changing administrations. 
Limiting medical regulation to protecting human health does 
not suggest that the other concerns raised about enhancement 
practices are meritless or unworthy of respect, or that individuals or 
their elected representatives are powerless to respond to them. 
Banning technologies is not the only way to address the harms these 
practices may create, or even the most effective way. Legislators 
could address concerns about coercion by prohibiting employers and 
schools from requiring employees and students to use these 
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interventions.339 Professional organizations, such as the American 
Medical Association, could promulgate guidelines to their members 
regarding the ethics of assisting with identity-modifying practices, 
including “how to strike the balance of limits for patient benefit and 
protection in a liberal democracy.”340 
If all else fails, there is always moral suasion. Those who are 
convinced these technologies are detrimental to human flourishing 
can argue their case rather than forcing their views on others 
through the law.341 Some people may be persuaded that the benefits 
they had hoped to obtain through medical interventions are 
outweighed by the risks—whether physical or spiritual—that these 
practices pose to themselves or the harms they may impose on 
society. Conversely, through dialogue some critics may themselves 
come to see certain practices in a new light. When dealing with 
decisions affecting control over one’s body and mind, the default 
position should be one of respect and tolerance, with a high burden 
of persuasion on those who would advocate coercive responses. 
  
 
 339.  Greely, supra note 37, at 704. 
 340.  Id. 
 341.  Randy E. Barnett, The Harmful Side Effects of Drug Prohibition, 2009 UTAH L. 
REV. 11, 13 (2009) (“[E]ven people who agree about the facts fail to grasp that it is the nature 
of the means—coercion—chosen to pursue the suppression of voluntary consumptive activity 
that makes these [negative effects of prohibition] unavoidable.”). 
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